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Summary 
 
Reason and problem definition 
Organizations are increasingly confronted with procurement questions for which no or insufficient 
knowledge is present within the organization. In such cases, the necessary knowledge must be 
retrieved from the market. If the procurement project is also capital intensive, has multiple 
stakeholders and is long term, the project is a complex procurement issue. In order to cope with 
complexity, organizations are looking for effective procurement methods, such as Performance 
Based Contracting (PBC). In the application of PBC, specifications (in terms of desired output) are 
recorded at the beginning of the procurement process and it is left to the supplier to realize that 
output. Following PBC, we can see the emergence of Best Value Procurement (BVP). This method 
was developed by Dean Kashiwagi in the mid-nineties. In the Netherlands, BVP is also known as 
‘performance procurement’. BVP is also based on the idea of output control and a supplier who 
determines what the product or service will look like. Characteristic of BVP is that the client 
searches for a provider who is better than his respective competition. The supplier is given a lot of 
freedom to utilize his expertise, but also a lot of responsibilities for achieving results. The advantage 
for the procuring party is that all risks are borne by the supplier. However, it is not known or 
scientifically researched to what extent this particular distribution of risks leads to the desired 
results in practice. 
Another aspect concerns the (in)stability of specifications. Within the BVP method, the 
specifications are also defined at the beginning of the process, but this occurs under the 
responsibility of the supplier. The service definitions are not altered in conformity with the BVP 
method, because the supplier directs the process. The question is whether this functions properly, 
because research appears to indicate that particularly in complex procurement projects, a constant 
dialogue between client and contractor is required to sharpen the specifications, in order to ensure 
that the client actually gets what he wants.  
 
The question of the governance in buyer-supplier relationships has often been a research topic. In 
general, we can distinguish two vastly different governance methods: contractual and relational 
governance. Research indicates that only focusing on contract (output) does not lead to the desired 
results. This is opposite to the BVP philosophy where the contract is leading. Given the questions 
and problems described above, we have defined the problem for this study as follows: 
 
How is the (in)stability of specifications and (contractual and relational) governance handled in 
practice in the application of the BVP method in complex procurement trajectories? 
 
Research method 
The problem definition is researched by means of a case study, as there is little knowledge of the 
research subject. The selected case is a sourcing trajectory at Water Authority Vechtstromen on a 
complex procurement project, namely the optimal utilization of biogas sewage treatment plant 
Emmen. A capital-intensive process with a lot of risks in the field of environment and safety which 
makes the procurement process complex. The procuring organization did not have sufficient in-
house knowledge to come up with a solution to the problem and applied the BVP method. An 
extensive file has been kept of the procurement process which has been used and studied for the 
present case study. Three different parties were involved in the procurement process: the client 
(Water Authority Vechtstromen), the contractor (SH+E which was taken over by another party, 
Eliquo Energy & Water, halfway through the project), and the advisory engineering consultancy 
company Arcadis. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials directly involved in the 
procurement project of all parties. 
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Results 
In this case, the service definitions of three out of the four phases of the BVP procurement method 
have been altered. Only in the evaluation phase have these not been altered. In the preparatory 
phase, concretization phase, and execution phase, the service definitions have been altered as a 
result of uncertainty regarding the service definitions and because not all risk were identified. There 
was a constant dialogue between the procuring organization and the contractor. Contrary to what 
the BVP method presumes, the contract between the procuring organization and the contractor was 
drawn up jointly.  
It is notable that a maximum price was adjusted in this case, something that should not have 
happened according to the BVP philosophy. The procuring organization was confronted with 
calamities during the execution of the project and with additional wishes which have led to extra 
expenses because not all risks had been identified and because the constant dialogue between the 
parties led to new insights. Consequently, the service definitions were altered.  
Another notable outcome was that the parties did not only guide the project by means of the 
contract. Calamities, additional wishes and requirements and progress meetings are discussed on 
the basis of relational norms. Decisions were made in consensus and both parties had a joint goal. 
This too is perpendicular to the BVP philosophy as the contract is leading in the BVP philosophy. 
Relational aspects such as trust, flexibility, solidarity, and dialogue must also be present to make a 
complex procurement project into a success.  
 
We conclude that, in this case, the BVP method has not been strictly applied and probably would not 
have worked. Already for the fact that a constant dialogue between client and contractor appeared 
to be needed. The findings with regard to the relational and contractual governance phenomena and 
the (in)stability of service definitions are not in conformity with what the BVP philosophy posits. 
Furthermore, it is notable that BVP was viewed by the respondents as a good method to cope with 
complexity in this case.  
 
Recommendations  
It is recommended to investigate the BVP procurement method in cases which also display 
complexity, but that do not concern innovations. The dynamics are expected to be different in that 
case. This study concerns a unique case at a Water Authority. It is recommended to investigate this 
in other environments such as other Water Authorities or governments, such as municipalities, 
provinces, Rijkswaterstaat (Department of Waterways and Public Works) or the Rijksoverheid 
(Central Government). Additionally, the research object was a lower government, namely a Water 
Authority. It is recommended to research cases in the private sector where the procurement act 
does not apply and the client has more freedom to determine how a procurement procedure is 
performed. 
 
The quality of the procurement process could be dependent upon the experience of an organization 
with procurement, the organizational structure, and experience with the BVP procurement method. 
The results of research conducted in other organizations could be dependent upon how the 
procurement process is organized. It is recommended to take the abovementioned aspects into 
account for other organizations as well as which results this yields if the procurement process is 
organized differently.  
 
The present study is aimed at the BVP procurement method to cope with complexity. It is 
recommended to investigate how the phenomena manifest themselves in other procurement 
methods, such as the competition-oriented dialogue. Additionally, it can then be researched whether 
other procurement methods are also useful in coping with complexity. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Complex procurement projects are characterized by a high level of uncertainty and technological 
complexity, the involvement of a large number of factors, and a time span of multiple years (Olsen et 
al., 2005). The complexity makes it impossible to procurement goods and services separately. In the 
literature, procurement processes are often described as a number of phases that must be taken 
consecutively (Gelderman and Albronda, 2007). Traditional tendering according to the procurement 
process is not possible in case of complex procurement projects (Caldwell et al., 2009). Moreover, 
procuring services generally requires a different approach than procuring goods (Axelsson and 
Wynstra, 2002). The last four decades, scientific literature has paid increasingly more attention to 
procurement of professional services (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002; Selviaridis and Spring, 2010). 
Services differ from goods of four generic characteristics: intangibility, heterogeneity, co-occurrence 
with production and consumption, and the transience/impossibility to maintain inventory 
(Zeithaml et al., 1985). 
 
An important difference of services compared to goods, is that services are produced and consumed 
simultaneously (Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009). This simultaneous character gives rise to constant 
interaction between the procuring organization and the service supplier. In the literature, 
composing service definitions is viewed as an activity that should have taken place during the first 
phase of the procurement process, the specification phase (Selviaridis et al., 2011; Ahlstrom and 
Nordin, 2006). We also see this in publications that recommend performance based contracting as 
the method for procuring complex procurement projects: the desired output is established at the 
beginning of the procurement process and it is left to the supplier to realize that output (Kim et al., 
2007). Performance based contracting is regularly and increasingly often applied in practice (Hypko 
et al., 2010; Sumo et al., 2014). A literature study by Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015), appears to 
confirm this upward trend of performance based contracting.     
 
In line with performance based contracting, we can see the emergence of Best Value Procurement. 
This method was developed in the mid-nineties by the American Dean Kashiwagi of the 
Performance Based Studies Research Group of the Arizona State University. In the Netherlands, Best 
Value Procurement is also known as ‘performance procurement’. BVP is also based on the idea of 
output-control. Additionally, the output of the service is fixed (Kashiwagi, 2011). According to 
Kashiwagi (2012), BVP is the procurement method in which the supplier is the expert and the 
procuring party is ignorant or possesses too little or no expertise to specify the services. 
Furthermore, Kashiwagi indicates that the procurer must not specify, because, in doing so, the 
procurement will negatively influence the quality of the services to be procured. The supplier 
determines what the product or service will look like. The advantage for the procuring party is that 
all risks are borne by the supplier. However, it is not known or scientifically researched to what 
extent this division of risks leads to the desired results in practice. 
 
The supplier draws up the contract and control is exercised by means of the contract (contractual 
governance). BVP states, by covering risks it does not matter who the supplier is (Van de Rijt and 
Santema, 2009). Suppliers are selected on the basis of their expected performance, and preferably 
the best supplier, who can provide the most added value, is chosen. Best Value Procurement is 
therefore also viewed as the answer to failing procurement practices in which procurement 
occurred traditionally, at the lowest price and without a lot of confidence in the suppliers. Best 
Value Procurement means that the procurer must look for experts who will be given the 
responsibility to deliver performances and who are able to handle this responsibility. In a nutshell: 
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more freedom, but also more responsibility for suppliers. The client does provide control measures 
that minimize risks and increase the exchange of information (Rijt and Santema, 2009). For the 
client, it will be difficult not to interfere with the expertise and the work of the supplier. The client 
selects a high-performer, not by drafting detailed specifications, but rather by making the supplier 
accountable for the accompanying performances. BVP is particularly popular within the public 
sector, where procurers look for the best suppliers with whom a good contract is entered into. The 
question is whether that is justified.  
 
Another point concerns the (in)stability of specifications. Within the BVP method, the specifications 
are also established at the beginning of the process, but now under the responsibility of the 
supplier. Procuring on the basis of BVP means that the tenderer sets the primary boundary 
conditions as requirements in his tender documents and additionally formulates the objective(s), 
which must be achieved through the work to be realized, the product to be delivered, or the service 
to be provided by the beneficiary enterprise. The core of BVP is that the procurer does not provide a 
worked-out detail specification, a few A4 pages are the starting point (Van de Rijt and Santema, 
2009; www.nevi.nl/bvp). However, the result is that, once a supplier has been selected based on the 
decisions regarding the specifications, the specifications do not change after the specification phase 
has been completed. Only those aspects of the service definition needed to select a service provider 
will be included in the contract. Yet, procuring organizations are not always capable of drafting 
detailed and complete specifications (Ellram et al., 2008). Complex procurement projects require 
frequent interaction between the procuring and delivering organizations during the specification 
phase (Van der Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009).  
Recent studies have also shown that service specifications are often instable (Selviaridis et al., 2011; 
Van der Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009), but also that stability is not necessarily desirable (Gelderman 
et al., 2015). The dialogue between buyer and supplier gives rise to dynamics in the service 
definitions. Dynamics in specifications during the entire procurement process could even contribute 
to the success of the tender process (Gelderman et al., 2015). Allowing the altering of service 
specifications could well increase the usability of the delivered services. It is unclear to what extent 
the BVP method leaves room for altering specifications and how the practice deals with the 
specifications, particularly in complex procurement projects.    
 
We could ask ourselves how the BVP practice handles the risks and uncertainties connected to 
complex procurement projects. In the BVP method, output control is central. Eventually, 
performance is key, where the supplier is given a great responsibility. BVP is perpendicular to more 
traditional procurement approaches in which the procurement is performed with strict 
specifications and detailed systems to control supplier performance (Van de Rijt and Santema, 
2009). The question of the governance in buyer-supplier relationships has often been studied. In 
general, we can distinguish between two opposite governance methods: contractual and relational 
governance (Caniëls et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2008; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
Caniëls et al. (2012), Cao and Lumineau (2015) and Gelderman et al. (2015) have conducted 
research into the interaction of relational and contractual governance in a complex tender process. 
Their studies show that, in addition to contractual governance, relational governance and trust also 
appear to be important governance aspects. The more dynamic the service definitions, the more 
relational governance is needed. The BVP procurement method focuses on contractual governance 
and all risks are placed with the supplier. Relational governance assumes a shared set of norms and 
values between the parties (Wang et al., 2008). Important relational norms include flexibility, 
solidarity, and the exchange of information (Heide and John, 1992), as well as reciprocity, integrity, 
and conflict management (Ness and Haugland, 2005). BVP does not assume relational governance, 
but rather contractual governance. However, it is not known to what extent contractual governance 
functions properly in practice.  
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In practice we often see mixed forms of buyer-supplier relationships. Both governance mechanisms 
are used for the management of the procurement project. Relational and contractual governance 
can also interact, as research by Caniëls et al. (2012) and Cao and Lumineau (2015) shows. 
Particularly the interaction between the governance mechanisms is considered to be the key to a 
successful set-up and execution of complex procurement projects (Caniëls et al., 2012). In studies by 
Selviaridis et al. (2011) and Gelderman et al. (2015), the link was also made with the interaction 
between relational and contractual governance during the process of stabilization and 
destabilization of the service definitions. The question now is whether we could also observe such 
an interaction BVP procurement projects.  
 
On the basis of the points and problems above, we have defined the problem for this study as 
follows: 
 
How is the (in)stability of specifications and (contractual and relational) governance handled in 
practice in the application of the BVP method in complex procurement trajectories? 
 
1.2 Research Method 
In order to answer the research question, we have opted for a case study. According to Yin (2003), 
there are three factors that influence the choice of the research strategy: 
 
1. The formulation of the question. 
2. The extent of control a researcher has on the behavioral expression to be researched.  
3. The level of focus on contemporary or historic phenomena.  
 
Yin (2003) indicates that the choice for a case study offers advantages when the research question 
concerns a how or why question on contemporary events over which the researcher has little or no 
control. The problem is defined as a “how” question, a question that is exploratory in nature. 
According to Yin (2003, every research strategy can be used for “how” questions. In addition to an 
exploratory character, the problem definition is also descriptive in nature. The present study makes 
use of a case study investigation. First because there is relatively little research done on the factual 
application of BVP. Publications are often anecdotal. Secondly because case studies are preferred to 
answer “how” questions. In the present study we wish to create insight into the use of BVP in 
practice. How professionals handle questions regarding the (in)stability of specification and 
selection and the use of governance mechanisms in the application of the BVP method in practice. 
Thirdly, this study does not concern behavior that can be manipulated which automatically excludes 
the experimental research strategy. Given the fact that this study concerns current behavior, historic 
research is also not an option, making the case study the best choice of research strategy.  
 
According to Ghauri (2004), a case study is a suitable tool if the research area is a relatively 
unknown phenomenon. Eisenhardt (1989) also says that case studies are especially suited for new 
research areas and new areas for which the existing theory is not yet adequately developed. Cao and 
Lumineau (2015) and Caniëls et al. (2012) have conducted research into contractual and relational 
governance, but the results cannot yet be generalized. This study conducts a case study into 
contractual and relational governance and the stabilization and destabilization of specifications in 
the application of the BVP procurement method. How are these phenomena handled during the BVP 
procurement process? A relatively unknown phenomenon, certainly in combination with the BVP 
procurement method. 
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In this study, we have opted for a single case study investigation. In order to perform a single case 
study, the study must be suitable for the application of a case study. Yin (2003, p39-41) describes 
five conditions for the applicability of a single case study investigation. An important condition is 
that it concerns a unique case.  
 
The present study is about a unique case. It concerns a specific sourcing process at Water Authority 
Vechtstromen. Water Authority Vechtstromen was the result of a merger between Water Authority 
Hunze en Aa and Water Authority Velt en Vecht. The merger took effect on January 1, 2015. The 
tasks of the Water Authority include: clean water, dry feet, and safe dykes. Water is purified at the 
water treatment plants. During the purification of water, the influent (waste water) is first 
thickened (dewatered) and subsequently fermented. During fermentation, gas is released which can 
be used for the production of energy. This does require CHP installations. A capital intensive process 
with a lot of risks in the field of environment and safety, which makes the procurement project 
process. Such a process was procurement at Water Authority Vechtstromen with the application of 
the BVP method. Given the complexity of the process, the procuring party opted for the BVP method 
for a number of reasons: 
 
1. The procuring party wished to cover all risks. 
2. The Water Authority was looking for a party that possessed the best knowledge and quality. 
3. The Water Authority wished to obtain innovations from the market. 
 
The data are collected by investigating the documentation of the case concerned, and by conducting 
semi-structured interviews with a number of key employees during the procurement process. 
Triangulation is achieved by approaching the case from various angles. Both the internal executive 
department, the procurement department, and the supplier are interviewed. The interview results 
are tested by means of the documentation investigation.  
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2. Literature Study 
The problem definition yields the following variables, which form the basis on which the literature 
study is conducted.  
1. Complex procurement trajectories 
2. Standard procurement approaches 
3. The BVP procurement method 
4. The (in)stability of service specifications 
5. Relational and Contractual governance 
 
Variables 1 and 2 are descriptive in nature. From variables 3 to 5 propositions are formulated 
regarding the role of these variables in the BVP procurement process. 
2.1 Complex Procurement Trajectories 
Complex procurement trajectories are characterized by a high level of uncertainty, risks, and 
technical complexity. Additionally, there are a lot of parties involved in the procurement process 
and such processes have a time span of multiple years (Olsen et al., 2005). For a procuring party, 
complex procurement trajectories are not standard processes in which the desired components can 
simply be bought. Complex procurement trajectories require a different approach than traditional 
procurement methods do and are capital intensive (Caldwell, 2009). In complex procurement 
trajectories, it practically never concerns the procurement of pure goods but rather the provision of 
services and/or the combination of both (Caldwell, 2009; Olsen, 2005). The procuring party is 
looking for a service provider who can deliver a total concept in which goods and services are 
combined. Procuring organizations increasingly choose a total solution for a procurement issue. The 
procurement of services is more complex as services have a number of characteristics that make the 
procurement more complex. These characteristics are: 
 Intangibility. Services are not concrete and tangible and that makes it difficult for a 
procuring organization to specific the services and to specify exactly which services are 
needed. Additionally, it is also difficult to ascertain, after the delivery or completion of the 
order, whether the service provider has met the obligations (Ellram, et al., 2007; Elram et al., 
2008). Services are most visible and tangible at the moment of delivery.   
 Simultaneity (in Elram Inseparability). Production and consumption of the services occur 
simultaneously in constant interaction between the procuring organization and the service 
provider. Consequently, the definition of the services is subject to constant changes (Valk 
and Rozemeijer, 2009).  
 Heterogeneity. The personal knowledge, skills, and behavior of the employees of the 
procuring organization and the service provider play an important role in the production of 
services. The efforts and characteristics of employees influence the quality of the delivered 
services. This makes it difficult to achieve consistent quality (Gummesson, 1978).  
 Perishability. Finally, the durability of services is limited. The value of services for the 
procurement organization is time-, place- and person-restricted.   
 
The procurement process in complex procurement trajectories requires constant interaction 
between the buyer and supplier (Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009).  
The challenge for the management is to cover the characteristics of complex procurement 
trajectories and in doing so build in governance mechanisms that can cover those pitfalls 
(Williamson, 1985). The pitfalls procurement departments have to deal with are opportunism, 
uncertainty, and transaction expenses. 
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Despite the increased demand for solutions for complex procurement trajectories, research into the 
procuring of complex procurement trajectories is scarce (Ellram et al., 2007; Nordin and Agndal, 
2008). At the same time, procurer s state that buying a product-service-package is much more 
complex than the procurement of goods or ‘pure’ services and procurer s claim that they are less 
competent in handling this complexity (Smeltzer and Ogden, 2002). The quality of the results in 
complex procurement trajectories is not only dependent upon the input of the service provider, but 
also of that of subcontractors and final users (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). 
 
There is complexity when the results are uncertain, when there is technical complexity, when there 
are significant risks which are difficult to control for the procuring party, or when the procuring 
party does not possess the required knowledge, and when multiple parties are involved in the 
procurement process. Additionally, these are trajectories that concern a time span of multiple years. 
Not only the strategic and tactical components are important, but so is the phase of contract 
management because of the demand for total service provision of procuring organizations. Not only 
the delivery is a key issue but also the execution and management of the contract. 
The present study uses the procurement of CHP installations at Water Authority Vechtstromen as its 
case. A complex trajectory as there are multiple parties involved, there is a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the results, it is capital intensive, and has a time span of 
multiple years. This case was also chosen because not only the procurement trajectory was 
important, but the phase of contract management as well. The entire tender trajectory must be 
overseen. The procuring organization requires a total solution for the procurement question. Not 
only the physical CHP installations, but also the service provision for installation, maintenance, and 
repair. 
2.2 Standard Procurement Approach 
A procurement decision is practically never an independent event. Various persons from various 
departments are involved, both within the procuring organization and the selling organization 
(Gelderman and Albronda, 2007).  
The procurement process consists of a number of sequential phases and there are many varieties of 
the procurement process. The most often used process model is the procurement process by Van 
Weele (2005). This process has been presented in a flow diagram below: 
 
          Tactical process                                         Operational process 
 
 
Figure 1 Procurement process Van Weele 
The phase of the pre-trajectory (1) is about need and available budgets for the procuring 
organization.  
The specify, select, and contract phases (the tactical phase) are the phases in which the tender is 
drawn up, suppliers are selected and evaluated, and eventually the order is awarded and the 
contract is drawn up. The operational phase follows the tactical phase in which the execution of the 
contract and the contract management occur.  
The table below presents which activities take place in the various phases of the procurement 
process according to Gelderman and Albronda (2007). 
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Table 1 Activities procurement process per phase 
Phase Activity 
1. Preliminary-stage 1. Determining procurement need 
2. Determining the offer (for instance through value chain, product, 
and market analysis) 
3. Estimation and determination of the financial budget 
4. Choice of procurement procedure or tender procedure 
2. Specify In this phase, the needs of the organization and the requirements the 
product and/or service to be procured must meet are determined. Five 
groups of requirements can be distinguished: 
1. functional (functions and user objectives) 
2. technical (materials, weights, dimensions, etc.) 
3. logistical (availability, delivery times, etc.) 
4. quality (norms, tolerances, procedures) 
5. commercial (contract form, price conditions, method of payment, 
liability, warranty) 
In addition to the above requirements, increasingly more attention is paid 
to Corporate Social Responsibility. In addition to the environmental 
aspects, the social aspects have also gained more attention, particularly in 
the public sector. It falls outside the scope of the present study to 
elaborate on this further. 
3. Select 
 
 
 
The offer trajectory is central in this phase in which the following 
activities take place: 
1. Offer request 
2. Offer evaluation 
3. Negotiating  
4. Market research 
5. Choice of supplier 
4. Contract 
 
1. Contract negotiations 
2. Drawing up contract 
3. Taking out contract 
5. Order 1. Placing an order/Order for delivery 
2. Recording and managing order information, including key figures 
as order frequency and financial information. 
6. Monitor 1. Order monitoring (control of delivery conditions)  
2. Processing and paying invoices  
7. Evaluation 1. Managing additional work and budget overruns 
2. Handling claims and penalty clauses  
3. Vendor rating (evaluation of supplier) 
 
The flow chart and the activities regarding the procurement process above are standard activities 
taken during standard procurement processes. During the specification phase, the requirements for 
the potential suppliers are determined. It is established which procurement need has arisen and a 
preliminary description of the services to be procured is drawn up, etc. Additionally, the 
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procurement package is determined. The service and/or delivery to be procured may fall under IT< 
HRM, Financial, Facility, etc. Furthermore, it is established which competences a service supplier 
must have in order to deliver professional services. In a standard procurement trajectory, in the 
specification phase, the procuring organization details exactly which requirements the product, 
service, and selling organizations must meet. There is a clear distinction between the specification 
phase and the selection phase in traditional procurement trajectories. The implication is that a 
supplier is selected based on decisions from the specification phase and that the specifications will 
not be altered anymore (Gelderman et al., 2015). A procuring organization cannot always have the 
necessary in-house knowledge of a certain service and/or product. This can create noise, resulting 
in the growing risk of procuring inferior quality (Kleemann and Essig 2013; Selviaridis, 2011). 
Awarding at the lowest price in complex procurements can eventually be more expensive. 
 
In order to achieve the desired output and minimize the risks, procuring organizations procure 
more based on result where the risks are borne by the service provider. A standard procurement 
approach in this way of procuring is the Performance Based Contracting (PBC). PBC originated in 
the aircraft industry and defense industry. Kleemann and Essig (2013) have conducted research 
into the improvement of procurement results in complex procurement trajectories. In their study, 
the Performance Based Contracting (PBC) is described as a procurement method which is guided by 
results and outcomes. The PBC trajectory does not describe how the goods must be delivered and 
which means the supplier must use (Kim et al., 2007). This implies a high level of flexibility and 
responsibility given to the supplier. The compensation the supplier receives for the delivered 
solution is dependent upon the delivered quality (Hypko et al., 2010; Kleemann and Essig, 2013). 
According to these researchers, a procuring organization is able to cope with the complexity better 
by applying PBC. Procuring organizations are increasingly looking for a total solution for 
procurement demands. Particularly in case of the combined procurement of services and goods. PBC 
can result in better product performance by making the supplier responsible for the outcome (Kim 
et al., 2010; Hypko et al., 2010). As described in section 2.1, the combination of the procurement of 
services and goods is complex and buyers indicate that they are less competent to specify and 
procurement such combinations. Combined procurement nearly always concerns a main supplier 
and sub-suppliers. PBC describes how these relationships can be managed. Information plays a 
critical role in PBC (Kleemann and Essig, 2013).  
Van der Valk, Wynstra, and Sumo (2013) have also conducted research into PBC. Their study 
particularly focuses on the triangular relationship between procuring organization, supplier, and 
consumer. The question of how PBC can be applied in this triangle of procuring organization, 
supplier, and consumer is central. In this case, the supplier delivers directly to the consumer. In 
order to manage this system, information flows are important and a formal contract serves as the 
control mechanism.     
 
PBC is a procurement method that aims for desired outcome and results. Quality is measured by 
supplier performance in the total result. Supplier is not evaluated on behavior (for instance in the 
quantities to be produced or number of hours). No p x q, but a total solution. Management and 
control is exercised via the contract and is formal in nature. This formal contract leaves little room 
for interpretation, adjustments, or room to cope with changing external circumstances (Hypko et al., 
2010). Risks are borne by the supplier and the question can be asked whether risks are not charged 
by the supplier. Eventually this can lead to higher costs for the procuring organization. 
 
2.3 The BVP Procurement Method 
Following PBC, the method of BVP was developed. The founder of BVP is American Professor Dean 
Kashiwagi, who is connected to the Arizona State University. Best Value Procurement (BVP) is a 
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vision and method for procuring and tendering of which the main focus is not price, but the 
performance of market parties (Van de Rijt and Santema, 2009). It is a different view on procuring 
and tendering than that which is usually applied. This paradigm shift has led to the procuring 
organization focusing on procuring the highest value and subsequently obtaining this at the lowest 
price (or at least a price fitting in the budget). Although BVP is a new procurement method, it does 
build on procuring and tendering according to the MEAT principle (Most Economically 
Advantageous Tender). The BVP approach is stooled on the conviction that risks are minimized or 
eliminated when information is effectively used. In other words: the more information is available 
and the better this information is utilized, the better the future can be predicted and the fewer 
decisions have to be made. The larger the processing capacity of people and organizations (read: the 
more information is utilized), the better the future can be predicted. This theory is called the 
Information Measurement Theory (IMT) (Kashiwagi, 2012). 
 
Sharing information and risks 
The theory by Kashiwagi (2011, 2012) concerns information and risks. Both matters are essential to 
the procurement process. After all, an organization must select a contractor who will best realize its 
project. In order to predict this, it is first crucial to know as much as possible about the offering 
party and to use this information in the selection process. Secondly, the contractor will have to be a 
market party who is best able to utilize the information on the project. He or she is the expert and 
should, better than anyone, be capable of using this information to signal and control risks and to 
successfully complete the project. Making good use of all available information also means that the 
distance between reality and expectations is minimized. Expectations of clients often arise because 
information is not properly used: personal ideas, experiences, ambitions, and a lack of knowledge 
and experience fill this void, giving rise to expectations (Van de Rijt and Santema, 2009). It is up to 
the contractor (the expert) to correct these expectations and align them with reality. The most 
important task of clients is to recognize and select experts. BVP is based on taking responsibility, 
dominant information, and measuring performance. This leads to more transparency. BVP does not 
have a different distribution of risks between the client and the contractor (the distribution of risks 
is dependent upon the chosen contract form). It is the case, however, that, due to the emphasis on 
proactive behavior from the contractor, all risks can be identified in advance which makes them 
controllable. 
 
Role client and contractor in BVP 
BVP is aimed at procuring the highest value for the lowest price. To achieve this, it is crucial that 
clients review their position with regard to contractors and align this with the following principles: 
 
It is the task of the clients to find experts (contractors) who can perform the order. This 
demands that the clients: 
 Take stock of their needs and expectations and communicate these to contractors 
 Monitor on the basis of information that is actually available and make decisions by 
minimizing own interpretations  
 Identify the Best Value provider, acknowledge him/her as expert, and facilitate him/her 
in the execution 
 
It is the task of the contractor to perform the order as an expert. This demands that the 
contractors: 
 Are proactive  
 Minimize and control risks  
 Define the difference between expectations of the client and reality 
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Contractor becomes owner of the problem  
The current practice is often different. Clients consider themselves to be the owners of the problem 
(Van de Rijt and Santema, 2009). They try to cover themselves by drawing up minimum norms and 
detailed specifications contractors must meet. As a result, competition exclusively occurs on price, 
due to which contractors can only conform to the established minimum requirements (‘for this low 
price, we do not do more than the minimum norm’). In this way, clients incite good contractors to 
negatively adjust the quality of their service provision. After all, they are ‘punished’ in the ‘final 
score’ if they deliver more quality, as that will also increase the price (Kashiwagi, 2011; Van de Rijt 
and Santema, 2009). For the same reason, innovations are not desirable either. These are not 
specified and are punished in the awarding. Clients must learn to aim for objectives and to assess 
whether the contractor is able to realize these objectives and is able to manage the process with his 
quality systems. The table below presents the differences between traditional standard 
procurement approaches and the BVP method. 
 
 Table 2 Differences  
Traditional (lowest price) BVP 
Client is the expert and makes too many 
decisions  
Contractor is the expert and makes sure the client makes 
as few decisions as possible  
A lot of communication As little communication as possible 
Using a lot of details Using dominant information  
Moving risks Controlling risks 
Thinking from I Thinking from we (win-win) 
Management, inspection and control Listening, observing and streamlining  
 
The BVP process consists of four phases presented below in a flow chart.  
 
Figure 2 BVP procurement process 1 
Preparation phase 
In the preparation phase, the client must be trained in the methodology and learn how to recognize 
the expert, and the project objectives are formulated. Additionally, a strategic framework is 
established, a planning is made, weighing factors for evaluation are chosen, and a core document is 
drawn up with the project scope and the maximum price. 
The core document serves as information for the providers who wish to bid on the tender. 
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Evaluation phase 
After the preparation phase, the evaluation phase starts. The goal of the client is to find the provider 
with the best combination of price and quality. The emphasis lies very strongly on quality. Price, 
therefore, forms a relatively small factor in the evaluation. The risk dossier, the opportunities 
dossier, the performance substantiation, and the interviews are more important. Here, the provider 
shows: 
 How the provider approaches the projects. 
 Which client risks the provider observes and how the provider handles these; the tenderer 
is asked to minimize the impact of these risks, without taking over the risks. 
 The opportunities the provider sees and how the provider utilizes these. 
 That the key figures properly understand the project. 
When evaluating all documents, dominant information plays an important role: hard information 
that leaves no room for uncertainty.  
Subsequently, the key functionaries of the tenderers are interviewed. The goal of these interviews is 
to verify whether the tenderer can realize his plan in the execution phase with the people he 
employs. The interviews are the most important of all awarding criteria. After the intended 
contractor has been selected on the basis of the awarding criteria, the so-called pre-award phase or 
concretization phase follows.  
Concretization phase 
In the concretization phase, the intended contractor elaborates on his plan in further detail. A 
detailed planning is drawn up and the risks and control measures are further developed. 
It is important to know that there is no negotiation in this phase or any adjustment of the original 
offer: it is about the further clarification and concretization of the offer. Furthermore, the contractor 
shows how the promised results are made measurable during the execution. This is perhaps the 
most important phase, as this creates the basis for the management of risks and utilizing 
opportunities during execution. A great advantage: the Action Plan is finished before the execution 
starts. In this way, the Best Value approach ensures that as little disruptions in execution arise. 
Should this phase prove that the intended contractor does not meet the requirements, this phase 
can be gone through again with the expert who has submitted the second best tender. If the 
concretization phase has been completed satisfactory, the awarding of the contract and the 
execution of it follow.  
 
Execution phase 
In the execution phase, the contractor has a complete overview of the project because everything 
has been thought out and talked through in the previous phases. In this phase, the performance of 
the contractor and the client is measured. 
 There is a detailed planning. 
 The risks and the opportunities that limit those risks have been clearly defined. 
 The definition of the contractor’s offer is clear and sharp. 
 The contractor has signaled a number of opportunities and explored ways of utilizing these.  
 Performance indicators have been established to measure the performances of both the 
contractor and the client.  
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Weekly report 
On the basis of the dominant and transparent information in the Weekly Report (weeklies), the 
contractor can adjust, if needed, in order to improve his performances. Moreover, the 
responsibilities of both the contractor and the client are clear. 
BVP is a procurement method in which, contrary to standard procurement approaches (lowest 
price, MEAT, etc.), no detailed description of specifications is drawn up by the procuring 
organization. According to Kashiwagi, BVP presumes that this method is a perfect alternative to 
cope with complex procurement questions (Kashiwagi, 2010; Van de Rijt and Santema, 2009). 
Guidance and control have been formally stipulated in contracts in which every party involved 
known which responsibility is borne by whom. In the case of the research case, a BVP trajectory was 
chosen. The reasons for the procuring party to apply BVP are: 
 
1. The project has been marked as complex by the procuring organization.  
2. In the opinion of the procuring organization, there was not enough in-house knowledge to 
draw up the specifications. 
3. There were a number of risks present that the procuring organization did not know how to 
minimize. Additionally, not all risks were visualized.  
4. The procuring organization wished to procure a total solution and not just the ‘pure goods’. 
In addition to the installation, the total package consists of the installation and maintenance 
of the CHP installations. 
 
Flows of information play an important role in this trajectory. Not only between the contractor and 
client, but also within the societal context in which the trajectory operates provide the necessary 
flows of information that could influence the entire project. Given the above story, the following 
propositions have been formulated: 
 
P1: In the application of the BVP procurement method, all risks are identified due to which the client 
will not be confronted with calamities in unforeseen situations during the execution of the order. 
 
In the BVP procurement method, all risks are placed with the contractor. This can lead to the 
contractor marking down risks which may increase the costs for the procuring organization.  
 
P2: In the application of the BVP procurement method, a maximum price is determined by the client. 
The maximum price is not adjusted upward during the BVP procedure. 
 
In the BVP procurement method, the contractor is the expert and the client must leave the 
responsibility to the contractor. The client prescribes as little as possible with regard to 
specifications and mainly looks at the objectives that have been formulated. The contractor must 
reduce the difference between the expectations of the client and reality. For this purpose, the 
contractor submits an Action Plan that is not deviated from, but is only concretized further. 
 
P3: In the concretization phase of the BVP procurement method, the original offer of the contractor is 
not altered anymore. 
 
P1, P2, and P3 are also formulated within the framework of the (in)stability of the service 
definitions. According to the BVP procurement method, the specifications do not alter because the 
supplier is the expert.  
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2.4  The (In)stability of Specifications 
During the specification phase, traditional standard procurement procedures specify which 
requirements the product and/or service must meet. Furthermore, requirements are drawn up 
which the supplier must meet. However, when the dialogue is entered into with the supplier, 
specifications may alter during the procurement process as a result of the interaction between 
supplier and buyer (Selviaridis et al., 2011; Selviaridis & Spring, 2010; Gelderman et al., 2015). Upon 
the start of the procurement process, the specifications are stable and the interaction creates 
instability. This interplay can arise more than once during the procurement trajectory. As a result, 
the specifications may constantly be altered (Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009). 
As the procurement process advances, the specifications become more stable and definitive after an 
interactive procurement process between procuring organization and supplier. In complex 
procurement trajectories, there are a number of factors that have already been discussed in section 
2.1. These factors make it difficult for a procuring organization to draw up concrete specifications. 
The constant interaction between procurement organization and supplier is the most important 
reason for the constant adjustment of the service definitions. Initially fixed service definitions are 
discussed again due to additional knowledge and experience of the supplier or because, during the 
course of the procurement process, the need arises to make agreements on additional matters with 
regard to the specifications (Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009).  
 
Selviaridis et al. (2011) have conducted research into the how and why of the stability and 
instability of service specifications during the procurement process in logistics services. In their 
study, they have drawn the following conclusions: 
 
1. Specifications are continuously adjusted during the procurement process due to a cyclic 
process of defining and redefining of the services. There, the attention to various 
characteristics (functions, processes, results, required resources) of the services to be 
procured varies. 
2. Initially, the specifications are fairly open or instable and step by step become more 
concrete and stable at specific moments during the procurement process.  
3. The case study identifies five factors that influence the stability of the specifications. These 
are: sourcing capability, supplier expertise reliance, complexity, relationship continuity, and 
adaptive interactions. 
 
Gelderman et al. (2015) have conducted research into the dynamics of specifications in the ICT 
branch. Gelderman et al. (2015) concluded that, during the interaction between supplier and buyer, 
behavioral controls play a role during the specification phase and that the order phase aims for 
contractual controls in the output. Another conclusion in the study was that it is a good thing the 
specifications are stable and then instable, and subsequently stable again. In PBC, contracts are set 
in stone and cannot be made flexible and contractual outcome controls are aimed for. As soon as 
contracts are made more flexible, these are adaptive and changes are more easily implemented 
(Gelderman et al., 2015). Suppliers will then not mark down risks as much, due to which the 
procuring organization will not be confronted with additional costs and/or failed projects. 
 
BVP is a procurement method that gives suppliers a high level of freedom. The philosophy of BVP is 
that the procuring organization does not have sufficient knowledge to draw up the specifications 
and that the supplier is the expert (Kashiwagi, 2011; Van de Rijt and Santema, 2009). All risks are 
borne by the supplier and the supplier draws up the contract. Adjustment is formal via contractual 
controls. This is perpendicular to research by Gelderman et al. (2015), in which the approach is that 
the procuring party and the supplier are constantly communicating about these specifications. As a 
result, there is stabilization and destabilization of specifications in the procurement trajectory. 
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Particularly due to this dialogue and collaboration, the procuring party gets what is possible and 
needed, and the supplier is provided with information on time so he can deliver what is possible and 
needed. 
Given the above, the following propositions can be distilled: 
 
P4: The stability and instability of specifications in a BVP trajectory does not occur due to interaction 
between supplier and buyer, but due to identification of risks by the supplier. 
 
P5: The specifications are fixed and are not altered after the contract is taken out. Adjustment is done 
by the supplier and the buyer is informed on the adjustment afterwards, but is not involved in it. 
2.5 Relational and Contractual Governance 
In the contract phase of the procurement process, all agreements between buyer and supplier are 
established in contracts. In complex procurement trajectories, it is a challenge for organizations to 
draw up contracts and employ control mechanisms that can handle pitfalls. The pitfalls are 
associated with uncertainty, transaction costs, and opportunism that are clearly involved in complex 
procurement trajectories (Williamson, 1985). Governance mechanisms can be formal and fall under 
contractual governance or can be stooled on trust and shared norms and then fall under relational 
governance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Wang et al., 2008; Olsen et al., 2005). Relational governance 
suggests a set of shared norms and values between organizations that have a business relationship 
(Wang et al., 2008). Important relational norms are flexibility, solidarity, and the exchange of 
information (Heide & John, 1992), and reciprocity, role integrity, and harmonization of conflicts in 
the relationship (Ness & Haugland, 2005). These norms form a protection against opportunistic 
behavior (Caniëls, Gelderman en Vermeulen, 2012). 
 
Various studies have been conducted into governance in inter-organizational relationships. For 
example, relational and contractual governance can supplement each other (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; 
Ness & Haugland 2005). Furthermore, relational and contractual governance can be applied 
simultaneously (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Olsen et al., 2005). 
 
In their study, Ness & Haugland (2005) have subdivided contracts into three groups:  
1. Market contracts: These are formal contracts in which measurable performance indicators 
have been included, such as price, delivery times, invoicing, etc. 
2. Internal contracts: These reflect the hierarchy of exchange between organizations. For 
instance, who makes the decisions and which procedures are applicable. 
3. Relational contracts: These are often associated with long-term relationships or strategic 
alliances. Norms and values and processes are central. 
The three different contracts represent three different governance mechanisms, being 
price/incentives, authority, and trust and norms (Wang et al., 2008). Price/incentives and authority 
are formal contractual norms. 
 
In their study, Poppo & Zenger (2002) indicate that formal contracts can undermine the trust 
between organizations and encourage the opportunism to record everything formally. The more 
complex the contract, the more detailed matters such as processes and obligations are described in 
contracts. Poppo and Zenger (2002) also name three dangers due to which organizations tend to 
favor formal contracts, which are: asset specificity (sizeable investments in assets or human 
capital), measurement difficulty, and uncertainty. Poppo & Zenger (2002) call these factors 
exchange hazards and encourage formal contracts. Furthermore, they indicate that economists and 
sociologists view trust differently. According to economists, trust can be calculated and sociologists 
indicate that trust must grow through repeated interaction between organizations. According to 
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Poppo & Zenger (2002), relational governance can work as a safeguard against undesired outcomes 
and make contracts more flexible which makes alterations and adjustments easier. 
 
The interplay between contractual and relational governance must be balanced (Zeng et al., 2008). 
Too much relational governance can lead to blind faith and too much contractual governance can 
lead to overly detailed contracts and a lack of control. According to Caniëls, Gelderman and 
Vermeulen (2012) and Cao & Lumineau (2015), contractual and relational governance play a key 
role in inter-organization relationships and these often influence the performance of procurement 
projects.  
 
During the concretization phase of the BVP procurement method, the contractor further details the 
submitted plan and risks and governance measures are further elaborated. The original offer is not 
adjusted. Moreover, the performance indicators are established for both the contractor and the 
client. 
In the execution phase, the performance indicators are established and the contractor provides a 
detailed planning. 
 
BVP is a procurement method that aims for output and the contracts have a formal character. The 
BVP procurement method was applied in the research case and, given the above, the following 
proposition is formulated. 
 
P6: The BVP procurement method mainly aims for contractual governance and hardly at all for 
relational governance, assuming the economical perspective when establishing governance 
mechanisms.  
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Research Method  
A case study forms the basis for the present study. The argumentation and description of a case 
study have already been discussed in section 1.2 of this thesis. A case study was chosen because 
how and why questions regarding present-day events must be answered, which the researcher has 
no control over (Yin, 2003). Furthermore, the present-day phenomenon must be researched within 
its context and environment. The present study concerns a unique case which is the reason for the 
choice of a single case study (Yin, 2003). 
 
The goal of this study is to describe the empirical observations (descriptive) of the following aspects 
in the application of the BVP procurement method: 
1. Do specifications become stable and instable in the application of the BVP method and, if 
yes, how is this handled.  
2. Is contractual governance the main focus in the application of the BVP method or does 
relational governance play a more prominent role than the BVP procurement method 
implies? 
 
For the phenomena above, it is described how and why these occur in the application of the BVP 
procurement method in light of six propositions from literature. The six propositions are presented 
in the table below. 
 
P1  In the application of the BVP procurement method, all risks are identified due to which the 
client will not be confronted with calamities in unforeseen situations during the execution of 
the order. 
P2  In the application of the BVP procurement method, a maximum price is determined by the 
client. The maximum price is not adjusted upward during the BVP procedure. 
P3 In the concretization phase of the BVP procurement method, the original offer of the 
contractor is not altered anymore. 
P4 The stability and instability of specifications in a BVP trajectory does not occur due to 
interaction between supplier and buyer, but due to identification of risks by the supplier. 
P5 The specifications are fixed and are not altered after the contract is taken out. Adjustment is 
done by the supplier and the buyer is informed on the adjustment afterwards, but is not 
involved in it. 
P6 The BVP procurement method mainly aims for contractual governance and hardly at all for 
relational governance, assuming the economical perspective when establishing governance 
mechanisms. 
Table 3.1: Propositions 
 
The research method aims to answer the questions of how the practice deals with contractual and 
relational governance and with the (in)stability of specifications during the BVP procurement 
process. Is contractual governance really the main governance mechanism and do specifications 
remain stable? Why do these phenomena occur? The BVP procurement method presumes that, in 
the proper application of the procurement method, the procuring party is not exposed to risks and 
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that it receives exactly what it wishes to procurement. The question is whether this is true and if 
BVP does not promise too much. BVP is a form of PBC which is mainly output-oriented and the 
procurement process and the contract phase are formally completed. Research by Caniëls et al. 
(2012), Gelderman et al. (2015), and Selviaridis et al. (2011) shows that it is good that specifications 
become stable and instable and that there is an interplay of contractual and relational governance. 
Particularly the occurrence of these phenomena creates interaction between buyer and supplier and 
the procurement process is not unidirectional. Due to the interplay between contractual and 
relational governance and (in)stability of specifications, the procurement process yields good 
results for both the buyer and the supplier. The literature study has resulted in six propositions 
regarding these phenomena which receive attention in the BVP process. P4 states that the 
destabilization and stabilization of specifications is not caused by the interaction between supplier 
and buyer, but by the identification of risks by the supplier. P5 states that the specifications are not 
altered after the contract has been entered into. P6 states that BVP is mainly oriented on contractual 
governance assuming the economical perspective when establishing governance mechanisms. In the 
empirical study, the phenomena are detected during the BVP procurement process and it is 
researched to what extent the practice supports these propositions. 
 
The present study is aimed at the BVP procurement process and observes this from a number of 
perspectives in order to create a clear view of the procedure of the BVP procurement process. The 
perspectives are the procurement dossier, the contract, the weeklies, and the participants in the 
procurement process, both from the procuring and the selling organization.  
The procurement dossier is used for the document analysis. The documents from the procurement 
dossier include the following documents: the decision making to the procurement process, the 
documents from the preparation phase, the evaluation phase, the concretization phase, and the 
contract phase. Furthermore, all tendering documents, interview documents from the BVP 
trajectory, information notices, and the weeklies are studied. A complete overview of the documents 
is given in appendix 2. 
 
The analysis unit in the present study is an event, namely the BVP procurement process. It is 
expected that the results of this study will yield additional insights into the application of 
contractual and relational governance in combination with the stabilization and destabilization of 
specifications with regard to the studies by Caniëls et al. (2012), Gelderman et al. (2015), and 
Selviaridis et al. (2011). 
  
3.2 Data Collection 
3.2.1 Selection of Cases  
The data were collected in one completed BVP procurement process. In the selected case, this 
concerns a BVP procurement trajectory, namely the project Optimization utilization biogas sewage 
treatment plant Emmen.  
By means of the problem definition, a number of variables have been constructed from which six 
propositions have been distilled. The research case must meet a number of conditions in conformity 
with the problem definition. 
 
1. It must concern a complex product, service and/or delivery to be procured. 
2. The BVP procurement method must have been applied for the procurement of the project. 
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3. It must concern a completed procurement project, allowing the entire procurement process 
to be studied with regard to the phenomena of relational and contractual governance and 
the (in)stability of service definitions.  
4. There must be constant interaction between the procuring organization and selling 
organization in order to study the phenomena of point 3. 
 
The following additional requirements are applicable: 
 
1. The procurement process was conducted within the procuring organization by a team of 
which the participants could act as respondents for the present study. 
2. The service supplier has performed the process with a team of which the participants could 
act as respondents for the present study.  
3. A procurement dossier was kept which is available for research. 
 
The substantiation a complex procurement trajectory must meet is provided in section 2.1. The BVP 
procurement method has been discussed in section 2.3. 
 
A complex procurement trajectory has been selected as case. The case is about the procuring of a 
service, delivery, and installation, namely the project optimization utilization biogas sewage 
treatment plant Emmen, in Water Authority Vechtstromen (previously Velt en Vecht). A long-term 
project in which multiple parties are involved in the procurement process. In addition to the 
procuring organization and selling organization, engineering agencies/consulting agencies are also 
involved. Therefore, this case contains sufficient data and sufficient perspectives due to which 
events and insights of respondents can be connected within this one case. The following applies to 
the case optimal utilization biogas: 
 
1. The project is a complex mix of deliveries and services. This case concerns technical 
complexity, significant risks that are difficult to control by the procuring organization or of 
which the procuring organization has no in-house knowledge, the results or outcomes are 
not fixed and there are multiple parties involved. Additionally, the project has a time span of 
multiple years.  
2. As procurement method for the present project, the BVP procurement method was chosen 
to cope with the described complexity. 
3. The project optimization utilization biogas sewage treatment plant Emmen is a completed 
procurement process for which a maintenance contract was also taken out. 
4. There is continuous interaction between the procuring and selling organization in this case. 
 
Water Authority Vechtstromen (previously Velt en Vecht) wishes to optimize its energy 
management in a sustainable way in the sewage treatment plant Emmen. The current installation 
has become outdated and does not meet the requirements from the WM permit (environmental 
management Act). Therefore, this project is defined as ‘Optimization utilization biogas sewage 
treatment plant Emmen’.   
 
There is no life without water. We need it as drinking water, for agricultural purposes, in animal 
husbandry, and industry. The Netherlands usually has plenty of water, but is often unequally 
distributed and polluted. Therefore, water management is required. 
If there is too much water, the Water Authorities dispose of it. If there is too little water, they supply 
it. With permits they regulate the disposal of polluted water and they purify the sewage water. 
Moreover, they maintain flood defenses such as dykes and dunes. Some Water Authorities also 
manages roads and waterways.  
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Water Authority Vechtstromen (previously Velt en Vecht) is responsible for the management and 
maintenance of water in the south-east of the province of Drenthe and the north-east of the 
province of Overijssel. The management area of the Water Authority is highly diverse. The area 
includes nature, agriculture, buildings, and open water. 
The goal of the procurement trajectory is to select the expert capable of realizing the optimization of 
the gas and heat usage of the sewage treatment plant Emmen. The intended effects include: greater 
heat turnover capacity, higher energy efficiency, the most optimal utilization of biogas production, 
and striving for energy-neutrality. 
3.2.2 Interviews 
Three parties are involved in the project utilization biogas sewage treatment plant Emmen. First, 
the procuring organization, Water Authority Vechtstromen in Coevorden (previously Water 
Authority Velt en Vecht). The contractor who won the tender for this project is SH+E from 
Barneveld. SHE+E was taken over in 2013 by another market party and since has the name Eliquo 
Energy & Water BV. Additionally, a consulting engineer was hired by the Water Authority to aid 
them in the project.  
 
Through the client, five experts were involved in this project who all have knowledge within the 
field and/or are procurement experts. The procurement advisor and the project manager of this 
trajectory are the experts in the procurement domain. Additionally, they are a conversation partner 
in the trajectory. The project leader purification, the project leader execution, and the project 
manager are the material experts and have content-related knowledge of the field. They are also the 
ones who can draw up specifications. 
 
Through the contractor, two experts are involved in the procurement trajectory and the execution 
of the order. These are the director/project manager and the project leader of the contractor. Both 
managers are involved in the procurement trajectory and the execution of the project. They are 
conversation partners during the entire project and have content-related expertise.  
 
The advisory engineering consultancy which has been hired has appointed one expert in materials. 
This expert has contributed to the order description, the drawing up of specifications, and the 
guidance of the client before, during, and after the project. Moreover, this expert has also served as a 
conversation partner for the client towards the contractor.  
The abovementioned experts have been interviewed (see appendix 1).  
 
By working with respondents from various parties, it is possible to compare the possible 
perceptions of individual employees with perceptions of other employees. The interviews have been 
prepared identically, but have developed differently depending on the respondent due to the 
specific position of that respondent with regard to the executed procurement process. A recording 
was made of all interviews.    
 
3.3  Operationalization 
In this section, the terms from the propositions will be translated into measurable definitions that 
can be used in the data analysis. 
 
 A procurement trajectory is complex if there are a lot of risks, a high level of uncertainty 
about the outcomes, technical complexity, and if it involves multiple parties (Caldwell, 2009; 
Olsen, 2005).  
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 A risk is a problem that cannot be controlled by the client because the client does not have 
sufficient knowledge and expertise to identify it (Kashiwagi, 2010, 2012; Van der Rijt and 
Santema, 2009). 
 Competences, knowledge, and skill are factors that contribute to the successful performance 
of the project to be procured (Kashiwagi, 2010, 2012; Van der Rijt and Santema, 2009). 
 A stable service definition is a service definition on which a positive decision has been made 
(has been approved) and that is not under discussion in the procurement process (Valk and 
Rozemeijer, 2009).  
 An instable service definition is a service definition in which the parties involved in the 
procurement process have not yet reached agreement and regarding which interaction is 
still taking place (Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009).  
 A maximum price is an amount established by the client in the preparation phase of the BVP 
trajectory that may not be exceeded (Kashiwagi, 2010, 2012; Van der Rijt and Santema, 
2009).  
 Contractual governance concerns formal contractual governance mechanisms such as price, 
delivery time, invoicing, etc. (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Wang et al., 2008; Olsen et al., 2005).  
 Relational norms are flexibility, solidarity, and the exchange of information (Heide & John, 
1992), and reciprocity, role integrity, and harmonization of conflicts in the relationship 
(Ness & Haugland, 2005). 
 Market contracts are formal contracts which include measurable performance indicators 
such as price, delivery times, and invoicing, and that are relatively inflexible (Ness and 
Haugland, 2005).  
3.4 Data Analysis 
For the present study, the primary sources of data collection are the interviews and the document 
analysis. The document study consists of the full investigation of the procurement dossier. The 
interviews are fully transcribed and offered to the respondent for approval. In qualitative research, 
the data analysis is a process which can occur both after and during the data collection. The one 
interview can provide insights or data which in turn can serve as input for the next interview. 
In the present study, the results are categorized on the basis of the variables from the literature 
study. By means of a data matrix, an attempt is made to recognize patterns and whether or not the 
propositions are supported. The table shows the respondents in the columns and the questions and 
core of the answers (often only key words or fragments of sentences) in the rows.  
 
The data have been analyzed by means of the BVP procurement process and in light of the 
propositions. Data from the document analysis and the interviews have been ordered and 
connected to each other. The propositions (theoretical expectations) are compared to the empirical 
observations. Due to this comparison, it can be evaluated whether the propositions are supported.  
3.5 Methodological Issues  
3.5.1 Construct Validity 
Various sources have been used within one case. These concern the procurement dossier and the 
seven respondents. The respondents are from three different organizations. Four respondents are 
from the procuring organization, Water Authority Vechtstromen (previously Water Authority Velt 
en Vecht). Two respondents are from the contracting organization, SHE from Barneveld. One 
respondent is from the external advisory engineering consultancy. Triangulation occurs by relating 
the data from various sources to the propositions so statements do not rest on a single observation.  
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The results of the document analysis and the interviews are related to each other and a chain of 
evidence becomes visible with regard to relational and contractual governance and the (in)stability 
of service definitions.  
3.5.2 Internal Validity 
Results are proven by means of examples from the interviews, making what happened visible 
during the BVP procurement process with regard to contractual and relational governance and the 
(in)stability of specifications and which intentions the various respondents had. The examples are 
related to each other due to which they support and enrich each other and prevent that a conclusion 
is drawn on the basis of a single statement. The examples provide an internally verifiable 
relationship between the empirical research and the research results. 
3.5.3 External Validity 
Both the documentation study and the interviews have been prepared on the basis of theory on the 
procuring by means of the BVP procurement method, the theory on relational and contractual 
governance, and the theory on the (in)stability of service definitions. 
The research results have once again been related to the theory. Consequently, the results are 
embedded within the procurement theory concerned. 
3.5.4 Reliability 
The case study was set up on the basis of the protocols arising from the theory of case studies. The 
substantiation of the chosen method refers to the theory. Therefore, there is a theoretical basis for 
the research approach.  
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4 Results 
In this chapter, the results of the case study are discussed on the basis of the research question of 
the present study and the 6 propositions. In section 4.1, the project to be procured is clarified in 
more detail. Section 4.2 discusses the results of the document analysis, section 4.3 discusses the 
results of the interviews, and section 4.4 discusses the evaluation of the propositions. Section 4.5 
contains an ordering of the results regarding the themes from the research question. 
4.1   Case Optimization Biogas Sewage Treatment Plant Emmen 
The researched case concerns the procurement of an optimization project on a sewage treatment 
plant. The sewage treatment plant Emmen has an installation which primarily ferments sludge and 
excess sludge. This sludge comes from the sewage treatment plant Emmen and the remaining 6 
sewage treatment plants of the Water Authority Velt en Vecht. During the (anaerobe) fermentation 
process, biogas is created, a mixture of methane and carbon monoxide, polluted by H2S and 
Siloxanes. In a cogeneration, the biogas is converted into electricity and heat. The heat is used to 
heat up the sludge fermentation tanks and buildings. The electricity is used for the purification. The 
biogas production has greatly increased as all the purification sludge of Velt en Vecht is fermented 
in the sewage treatment plant of Emmen since the renovation. A substantial part of the biogas is 
currently flared. The objective is to utilize all the biogas and to convert it into energy in the form of 
heat and electricity for the benefit of the installations on the grounds of the sewage treatment plant 
Emmen. In 2012, a central heating boiler was installed to offset heat shortages of the sludge 
fermentation tank. 
The project objective has been formulated as follows:  
The optimal utilization of all the produced biogas for the production of thermal and electrical 
energy.  
4.2 Document Analysis 
The procurement dossier has been saved by the procurement department and contains the formal 
documents as of the start of the procurement process up to the execution and completion of the 
project. In appendix 3, an overview is included of the documents in the procurement dossier. The 
following analyses have been conducted on these documents: 
1. An analysis of the chronological course of the procurement process. (section 4.2.1) 
2. Which phenomena with regard to the BVP procurement process, (in)stability of the service 
definitions, and contractual and relational governance can be deduced from the documents. 
(section 4.2.2) 
4.2.1 The Chronological Course 
From the documents, the course of the BVP procurement process in time has been determined.  
Procurement phase  Activity Start 
Preparation phase 
Internal coordination of the specifications, drawing up 
tender documents and planning. Explanation of BVP 
method. Tender is published. 
Sept 
2012 
Evaluation phase 
Candidates have submitted an order and are evaluated in 
terms of risk and opportunity dossier, performance dossier, 
and interviews. 
Jan 2013 
Concretization phase 
Pre-award phase in which the order is elaborated on in 
further detail and the agreement is drawn up and signed. 
February 
2013 
Execution phase 
Contractor starts the execution of the project. Progress is 
monitored by means of weeklies. 
May 
2013 
Table 4.2.1 Course BVP process case 
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Preparation phase 
The start of the project was January 2012, when an exploratory investigation was conducted by an 
engineering consultancy by order of the Water Authority into the possible CHP scenarios and 
market consultation. The engineering consultancy has delivered a report on this (doc.33). This 
report formed the initiation for the first internal discussions on the service specifications. The 
internal discussions revealed that the project should not only be on the CHP installation, but that it 
included more than simply installing a CHP installation. That would not solve the problem. The 
supply of clean gas also formed part of the problem. For this purpose, it was decided to further 
expand the project and to tender for a total solution in the market. The documents from the 
preparation phase show that the stabilization and destabilization of the service definitions did not 
only arise from the market consultation, but also from internal discussions. 
 
The preparation phase was internal, but also there a lot of alterations occurred because we were still 
researching and discussing the right specs (GS). 
In the preparation phase, because there was a lot of internal discussion on whether we had the right 
specs (BB). 
 
In the period from June 2012 until November 2013, the project team of the Water Authority (BB, BS, 
VL, LJ, and JD) has detailed the scope of the tender and has drawn up as many documents with 
specifications and information as possible for the benefit of the tender documents (doc.20, doc.22 
up to doc.32, and doc.34).  
In the period from September 2012 until December 12, 2012, an information meeting was also 
organized in the preparation phase about the BVP method to provide explanation on the BVP 
method for both the Water Authority and the contractors (doc.16 and 17).  
 
The tender procedure 
For the tender, the documents with all specifications, information for the tenderers, the quotation, 
and the awarding criteria were combined and publicly published via www.tenderned.nl (doc.1 up to 
14, and doc.18). During publication of the tender, the service definitions are stable. There have been 
three rounds of questions during the tender procedures, the Information Notes (hereafter IN) 1, 2, 
and 3. Additionally, a clarification Note was published (doc.35 up to 38). During the INs, clear 
interaction can be perceived between the client and potential contractors. In the INs, market parties 
ask a lot of questions about the specifications. 
 
At the time of the information notes, lots of things have been altered. (LJ) 
 
The maximum price has been altered in the INs. This is not supportive of P2. The maximum amount 
has been altered from including VAT to excluding 21% VAT, and the multi-year maintenance was 
added which is covered via the exploitation. Moreover, a number of requirement specifications are 
altered due to which there are three versions of the tender ballot and the tender document (version 
1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 doc.1, 2, 7, and 19). P4 is therefore also not supported, because the specifications do 
not only alter due to the risk inventory, but also due to the interaction of the Water Authority with 
the market parties. 
 
Evaluation phase 
The offers of the tenderers are evaluated during the evaluation phase. This was a qualitative 
evaluation (doc.42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, and 51). In this phase, no specifications were discussed, but 
the submitted documents are tested on the basis of knowledge and expertise and whether tenders 
have a good overview of the project. Additionally, the risk and opportunities dossier is evaluated in 
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this phase and questions are asked about this in the interviews. Below is a fragment of the interview 
between the client and a tenderer. 
 
Why are these risks? These are things that you will handle, aren’t they?  
Yes, the risks that have been named here are risks that are not directly influenced by us (BV). 
 
The fragment above does not show that all risks can be governed by the contractor. For risks the 
contractor cannot exert influence, consultation with the client is essential. Therefore, there is 
interaction between the parties on the risks. This is contradictory of P4.  
 
During the evaluation phase, nothing can be altered because the only test is whether the plan is 
actually the best (LJ).  
 
The evaluation of the tender (doc.59) shows that not all dominant information was found because 
the questions were not asked by a material expert. Below are a few fragments from the evaluation 
document. 
The interviewees had also expected more content-related questions. The interviewer fails to ask follow-
up questions, because he does not have sufficient content-related knowledge. It is preferable that the 
interviewer has affinity with the field.  
Gerrit had expected more innovation from the tenderers. They did present ideas on certain 
components, but not dominantly. 
 
At the end of the evaluation phase there is the intention to award (doc.48). This initiates the pre-
award. The pre-award in this tender was awarded to SH+E (now Eliquo BV).  
All offers have been evaluated on the basis of the criteria included in the descriptive document. We 
intend to enter into the pre-award phase with SH+E Nederland BV. Your offer has been marked as the 
‘most economically advantageous tender’ (doc.48). 
 
Concretization phase 
In the concretization phase, the contractor has elaborated on his plan in further detail. A detailed 
planning has been drawn up, and the risks and control measures have been further elaborated. 
SH+E has written an Action Plan during the concretization phase and this plan has been discussed 
with the Water Authority (doc.54, 55). The order has remained largely unaltered in general terms, 
but on detail level it has been changed. The main order has been very broadly formulated, namely as 
an optimization process for the utilization of biogas. Various solutions were seen, as there were four 
tenderers, each with another proposal (doc.40). The broad formulation leads to interaction between 
both parties as multiple questions are asked from both sides. Doc.56 report pre-award with SH+E 
visualizes the detail alterations. Below are a few fragments. 
During this phase, the Water Authority will also provide additional information (also see IN) and will 
share the project risks reported by the remaining tenderers and the Water Authority with SH+E. 
 
BB clarifies that the Water Authority is interested in a further detailing of opportunity No.1. The Water 
Authority currently does not wish to make use of opportunities 2 and 3. SH+E confirms that they will 
further elaborate on opportunity No. 1 in their Action Plan during the design phase of the project (after 
pre-award).  
The project team of the Water Authority asks several questions and makes concerns and risks known. 
The request to SH+E is to include these items in the Action Plan, including risk dossier.    
 
The Water Authority will signal risks by making other tenderers available to SH+E via email.  
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JD says that there is probably already a buried gas pipe present at the location of the suggested site for 
the new CHP installation. SH+E will assess by means of the documentation that has been made 
available (WVV action 3) and will determine an alternative site if necessary.  
 
The passages from the report above confirm that the necessary changes have been made on detail 
level. There is interaction between the Water Authority and SH+E and the documents show that the 
process of stabilization, subsequent destabilization and again stabilization of specifications are 
clearly present. There is continuous interaction between the parties. Moreover, during the 
concretization phase, the risks of other tenderers have been made known to SH+E and SH+E was 
asked to elaborate on and govern these. Additionally, the first calamity was revealed in this phase; a 
gas pipe at the construction site. Consequently, P1 is not supported. P3 is also partially unsupported. 
The main order and the accompanying offer remain intact, but the specifications have been altered 
on detail level. The stabilization and destabilization of specifications also occur due to interaction 
between the Water Authority and SH+E and not merely due to identification of the risks by SH+E. 
The document analysis shows that P4 is not supported, because the specifications also alter as a 
result of interaction. 
 
After approval of the Action Plan, SHE will draw up the basic agreement and submit it to WVV. This 
basic agreement must also include matters that have not yet been established in the offer of SH+E.   
 
From the fragment above from the Action Plan pre-award report (doc.55), it seems that the contract 
was not drawn up by SH+E alone, but was drawn up jointly. According to the BVP method, the 
contract is drawn up by the contractor. In this BVP trajectory, however, that does not apply. Again, 
there is interaction between the client and the contractor.  
 
Execution phase 
The weeklies are an important aspect of this phase. In the weeklies of this project, the following 
matters are monitored:  
1. Which calamities occur and how are these solved. 
2. Controlling the risks. Do the risks manifest themselves and what does the contractor do to 
control the risks? 
3. Progress of the project. Is the project going according to plan and time schedule? If not, what 
does the contractor do to adjust?  
4. Consultation between the Water Authority and SH+E. What alterations occur and by whom 
must the costs for these alterations be borne? 
 
There are 36 weeklies present in the procurement dossier. The summary document weeklies has 
been used for the document analysis (doc.57). Below is a selection of the most important findings 
from the weeklies: 
 A lack of up-to-date certificates and inspection reports which led to a false start of the project. 
This has incurred additional expenses. Expenses are borne by the Water Authority which has 
been agreed in consultation.  
 Unacceptable risk of subsidence new installation because of poor soil quality. This has led to 
additional expenses because additional pile driving had to be performed. These expenses are 
borne by SH+E as agreed in consultation. 
 Necessary building ground on sewage treatment plant Emmen not available in conformity with 
zoning plan of the municipality of Emmen. Project delay. Water Authority and SH+E ‘guide’ 
authorities in a prompt permit granting. Division of responsibilities between municipality and 
province create delay in the settlement of the permit. Expenses for WSV. 
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 SH+E has ordered Van Gelder to place dewatering system without informing the Water 
Authority of this in advance. Additionally, there was no consultation with the management on 
the adjustments of the work. SH+E and Van Gelder urgently provide S&H forms, specific for the 
activities and the accompanying risks in the case of redirecting pipelines. Redirecting pipelines 
occurred at the expense of WSV because these were not on the drawings.  
 CHP engine does not start / fails. ‘Teething troubles’ in the first weeks hinder operations WSV. 
Extra assistance of synergy specialists. 
 Water Authority does not pay outstanding invoice of SH+E in connection with troublesome 
financial situation of parent company. Financial situation SH+E Group (GmbH) troublesome: 
automatic stay requested. 
 Remedying residual issues and general completion later than discussed. Eliquo keeps residual 
issues list, stating when and which residual issues are remedied. It is attempted to continue the 
activities during the summer as well. 
 
Adding additional activities such as emergency power provisions have not been included in the 
weekly, but in a separate document (doc.58 replacing main distributor). The consultation structure 
was as follows (doc.55): 
 Project management consultation during the entire runtime of the activities, a four-weekly 
PM consultation will be held.  
 Technical consultation Water Authority and SH+E hold a technical consultation as needed. 
Both parties can initiate such a meeting. 
 Execution consultation between Vincent van der Linden (WVV) and Barry Verduijn (SH+E) 
is held weekly during the execution phase.  
The weeklies show that the Water Authority and SH+E work together during the project. The 
division of additional costs is agreed by mutual consultation. If the Water Authority is culpable, the 
costs are paid by the Water Authority and if the calamity was due to SH+E, SH+E paid the expenses.  
P6 is largely unsupported. The contract was not a market contract (doc.52). The documents show 
that there was a balance between contractual and relational governance. 
4.3 Interview Results 
The interview questions have been categorized into the phenomena to be studied, which are: 
1. The BVP procurement process. 
2. The stability and instability of service definitions. 
3. Contractual and relational governance.  
The set-up and design of the interviews is included in appendix 1. The interview results per 
phenomenon are described below. The text in italic are fragments from the interviews. 
 
The BVP procurement process 
The BVP approach rests on the conviction that risks are minimized or eliminated in case of effective 
use of information. It is the most important task of clients to recognize and select experts. By 
emphasizing proactive behavior on the part of the contractor, all risks can be identified, and 
therefore controlled, beforehand. All respondents were positive about the influence of BVP on the 
success of the project. 
 
It became clear that the problem was more extensive, because there was also a gas and energy 
problem. This made it complex and we could not have solved this without BVP (BB). 
 
The trajectory was successful because more was done than intended and the results exceeded 
expectations. An integral solution was chosen (LJ).  
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It was certainly a successful project. Thanks to BVP, we can make use of our creativity, knowledge and 
expertise in the offer without being limited by a scope (BV).  
 
Initially, the trajectory to be procured was a CHP installation. However, the problem was bigger 
than originally thought. It was not just in the CHP installation, but also in the supply of gas and the 
quality of the gas. This made the problem more technically complex. The project was expanded into 
an optimization process utilization biogas. According to the BVP philosophy, BVP is a good method 
to cope with complexity. Questions were asked about this subject during the interviews and this 
provided the following image. 
 
We did not have sufficient in-house knowledge. This was especially due to the technical complexity. The 
contractor has certainly taken his responsibility. The dominant information was generally out in the 
open. During the trajectory, however, there were a number of questions that arose. It was not all black 
and white (BB).   
 
 They did have some in-house knowledge, but not enough. The complexity was caused by the extension 
of the building permit. The complexity was also related to the budget, there were multiple stakeholders 
and in the technical complexity (BV).  
 
With regard to complexity, the respondents agree that BVP is a good method to cope with 
complexity. In this project, the complexity was mainly caused by the technology and the permit 
trajectory. Not all dominant information was present, which led to adjustments.  
 
The supplier selection  
The theory of Kashiwagi (2011, 2012) concerns information and risks. Both matters are of vital 
importance to the procurement process. After all, it is key that an organization selects a contractor 
who will best realize its project. In order to predict this, it is crucial to know as much as possible 
about the contractor, and to use this information in the selection process. Secondly, the contractor 
must be a market party who can best utilize the information on the project. He or she is the expert 
and must be best able to use this information to signal and control risks and to successfully 
complete the project. The results from the interviews are as follows: 
 
Not all risks have been identified by the client. Due to a lack of information, additional work has arisen 
and, consequently, the maximum price has been increased. Not all dominant information was identified 
(LJ).  
 
During the execution, there were matters that should have been discovered during preparation, such as 
old cables and pipelines in the purification structure. The foundation was a calamity, the ground did 
not have sufficient bearing capacity for construction and that was a risk that had not been identified 
beforehand. Due to the additional work and additional requirements, the maximum amount has been 
increased (VL).  
 
All respondents are convinced of the knowledge and expertise, proactivity and innovative capacity 
of the contractor. Not all risks were identified beforehand, due to which the client was confronted 
with undesired events during execution. Furthermore, the additional work and undesired events 
caused the maximum price to be increased. 
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The stability and instability of service definitions 
Initially established service definitions are once again under discussion, due to the additional 
knowledge and experience of the supplier or because the need has arisen during the progress of the 
procurement process to make supplementary agreements with regard to the specifications (Valk 
and Rozemeijer, 2009). According to Kashiwagi (2012), the contractor is the expert and there is no 
interaction about the service definitions. The BVP philosophy is that the procuring organization 
does not possess sufficient knowledge to establish the specifications and that the supplier is the 
expert (Kashiwagi, 2010; Van de Rijt and Santema, 2009). Section D of the interview questions pays 
attention to this in light of the BVP procurement method. This provided the following results: 
 
Because questions were asked, interaction arose between ON and OG, leading to the destabilization 
and subsequent stabilization of specifications. The offer did not change in general terms. From the 
start of the BVP trajectory until submitting the offer, you have alterations that were brought to the 
discussion by the contractor. As the BVP process progressed, the specifications became increasingly 
stable. Constant dialogue? Yes, absolutely (LJ).  
 
The stabilization and destabilization of specifications did not only occur due to identification of risks 
by the contractor and it definitely happened in consultation with us. There was additional work and 
the scope has changed. This was done by both parties and was discussed and questioned by both 
parties. Yes, discussion became increasingly less frequent, a definite yes! What Kashiwagi says does not 
hold true! (GS). 
 
The BVP method already automatically leads to alterations, due to the adding of risks of others. 
Nothing but alterations in the execution phase. The maximum price was a challenge (VL).  
 
The respondents’ answers show that dialogue is essential in complex trajectories. In complex 
trajectories, not all risks are clear, can be overseen or can be placed at the responsibility of the 
contractor.  
 
Contractual and relational governance 
In the contract phase of the procurement process, all agreements between buyer and supplier are 
recorded in contracts. In complex procurement trajectories, it is challenging for organization to 
draw up contracts and employ governance mechanisms that can deal with pitfalls. In this project, a 
UAV-gc (Uniform Administrative Conditions for integrated contracts) construction was applied to 
stipulate the contract conditions. According to the BVP philosophy, output is what is aimed for and 
hardly for relational governance mechanisms. In the last section of the interview questions, the 
contract formulation, performance indicators, and how adequately the project could be guided by 
the contract are discussed. Additionally, questions are asked with regard to flexibility, solidarity, 
and trust. The answers of the respondents are stated below. 
 
Purely aiming for output would not have led to the desired end result. The support base would have 
been missing. I aimed for the relationship (VL).  
 
The answer is no, it was not purely oriented on formal PIs. Also on trust and solidarity that existed 
between us. The contract was flexible. The exchange of information was perfect and we had a common 
goal. I principally do not believe you can simply aim for just output, also not in case of BVP. The 
relational aspect is more important, the contract forms an incentive. You need both (BB).  
 
It is not the case that the contractor draws up the contract and the client says “where do I sign”. In 
addition to the PIs, there was sufficient flexibility. The contract was flexible enough to meet additional 
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wishes and to cope with calamities. The contract was not just pulled out at every occasion. We have 
achieved more by means of the relational aspects than by the formality. With just the contract, you 
won’t build up a relationship and working on trust alone creates too many risks (RL).  
 
The above shows that, in addition to the contract, relational norms were also important to the 
successful completion. The project was not merely contract-oriented, as in conformity with the BVP 
method, but relational governance mechanisms were also amply applied.  
 
In conclusion of the interview, each respondent was asked to give an overall evaluation of the BVP 
method. Matters such as usability of the method, when it did and did not work and whether another 
contract form or tender form would have been better in hindsight were discussed. The answers are 
given below. 
 
 A pure BVP as Kashiwagi prescribes does not work. Dialogue, trust, and flexibility are essential! (LJ).  
 
BVP offers room for new ideas, only the limitation of the number of A4 pages on which the offer must 
be written is a disadvantage. A competitive-oriented dialogue was also a possibility. The disadvantage 
of BVP is the maximum price, which is limiting, because this could inhibit innovations. The expert 
cannot be the expert on all components within the order, that’s where Kashiwagi is wrong! (BV). 
 
The respondents’ answers confirm that BVP is not a good method for coping with complexity, but 
that constant dialogue and dialogue form the key to success. A pure BVP method in a complex 
trajectory is therefore not recommended by the respondents.  
4.4 Evaluation of the Propositions 
In this section, the propositions are evaluated and compared to the interview results. With regard to 
the document analysis, the propositions have already been tested in section 4.2. The analysis is 
described per proposition and it is also indicated whether or not the propositions are supported. 
The propositions have been formulated on the basis of the phenomena: 
1. The BVP procurement method. 
2. The stability and instability of the service definitions.  
3. Relational and contractual governance. 
 
P1: In the application of the BVP procurement method, all risks are identified due to which the client 
will not be confronted with calamities in unforeseen situations during the execution of the order. 
The interviews clearly show that not all risks were identified because undesired events have 
occurred during the execution of the project. The undesired events have also led to additional work 
and additional expenses. A few calamities mentioned by the respondents are the foundation, the 
redirecting of cables and pipes, and incomplete drawings of the situation. The contractor also 
indicates in the interview that it is impossible to control all risks.  
A few interview fragments are repeated below. 
 
The maximum price was increased. This was caused by unforeseen situations which the client had not 
foreseen, where the question could be asked whether the requirement specification was complete (RL).  
 
Not all risks have been identified by OG (LJ). 
 
During the execution, there were matters that should have been discovered during preparation, such as 
old cables and pipelines in the purification structure. The foundation was a calamity, the ground did 
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not have sufficient bearing capacity for construction and that was a risk that had not been identified 
beforehand (VL). 
 
P1 is therefore not fully supported. The client was confronted with calamities and unforeseen 
situations during execution.  
 
P2: In the application of the BVP procurement method, a maximum price is determined by the client. 
The maximum price is not adjusted upward during the BVP procedure. 
This proposition is clearly not supported as well. The maximum price has been adjusted. The 
respondents indicate that there have been several cases of additional work, including the 
emergency power supply and the redirecting of cables and pipelines. Below are a few interview 
fragments confirming this. 
 
The additional work and supplementary requirements has led to an increase of the maximum amount. 
The continuous operation, the emergency power supply, to ensure that the installation could remain 
operational, created an increase of the maximum price (VL).  
 
Due to additional work, the maximum price has been increased. This work included the converting of 
an E-casing at our request and the redirecting of cables and pipelines (JD). 
 
The client has made extra budget available for the execution of the additional wishes at a later stage. 
For instance, the ‘islanding’ as emergency power supply was an additional requirement (BV).   
  
 
P3: In the concretization phase of the BVP procurement method, the original offer of the contractor is 
not altered anymore. 
In this project, only changes on detail level have occurred during the concretization phase. The 
contractor’s offer has not been altered in general terms. This proposition is partly supported. The 
BVP method also indicates that, in the concretization phase, the offer is worked out in detail by the 
contractor. However, the interaction with the client led to changes in details or additions to the 
order. Therefore, in this case, the contractor did not simply work out a detailed plan which the client 
agrees to, as in conformity with the BVP method. A few interview fragments: 
 
In the first offer, we did not yet know that the quality of the biogas was not high. This had 
consequences for our offer and we had to change technical components. In the pre-award, a part has 
changed (falls under the concretization phase) (BV). 
 
Yes, the offer has not been altered in general terms. There were technical deviations such as the 
desulfurization. Technical deviations will always occur, there’s nothing that can be done about that! 
Kashiwagi is too rigid in this aspect (BV). 
 
The offer has remained unaltered in general terms, but alterations on detail level have occurred, such 
as the gas filter, pipe works, and foundation. That’s just the way it is, there are always alterations in a 
complex trajectory (VL). 
 
P4: The stability and instability of specifications in a BVP trajectory does not occur due to interaction 
between supplier and buyer, but due to identification of risks by the supplier. 
P4 did not hold true, this proposition is not supported. The interview results show that 
specifications did not only stabilize and destabilize due to the identification of risks. There was also 
discussion about the specifications and the execution. The interview fragments below confirm this. 
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The specifications were altered by the management department of the Water Authority, because the 
department gave additional requirements. From the start of the BVP trajectory until the submitting of 
the offer, there are all kinds of alterations that are called into question by the contractor. In the 
concretization phase, both parties have discussed the specifications (LJ). 
What Kashiwagi says is really untenable! You never have full insight into everything, so the answer is 
no. The difference between the offer and what we expect also leads to interaction due to which 
alterations always occur (GS). 
During the project, the purification managers presented additional technical requirements that made 
the specifications instable (RL). 
 
P5: The specifications are fixed and are not altered after the contract is awarded. Adjustments are 
made by the supplier and the buyer is informed of the adjustment afterwards, but is not involved in it. 
P5 is also not supported. The interview results show that the specifications have been altered after 
the contract was entered into. Moreover, the contractor has not always informed the client in 
hindsight of the adjustments, but has rather consulted the client beforehand.  
 
The client has altered specifications after the contract was entered into, including the emergency 
power supply (RL). 
There was additional work and the scope has been altered. Most in the execution phase, actually (GS).  
Nothing but changes in the execution phase. Caused by renewed insights of both the contractor and the 
client (VL).  
In the project meetings, we have also discussed many matters, and during construction on location 
matters have also been discussed and resolved by mutual consultation. You can’t say: I as contractor 
decide that (JD). 
 
P6: The BVP procurement method mainly aims for contractual governance and hardly at all for 
relational governance, assuming the economical perspective when establishing governance 
mechanisms. 
This proposition is partly supported. The contract contains a number of hard performance 
indicators including the date of delivery, availability, reliability, and invoicing. The PIs are 
contractual governance mechanisms that fall under the economic perspective. However, the 
interview results show that the relational governance mechanisms have been applied more, and 
that these were balanced with the contractual governance mechanisms. Below are a few interview 
fragments. 
 
The contract wasn’t simply pulled out every time. No, all soft conditions that apply during a trajectory, 
such as relationship and trust, contribute to the success. With a contract alone, you won’t build a 
relationship and working just based on trust creates too many risks (RL). 
We noticed that you couldn’t just go by the contract, because that will lead to people digging in their 
heels. We had the contract when we needed it (GS).  
 
The table below states which propositions were not, partly, or completely supported.  
P1 Is not supported 
P2 Is not supported 
P3 Is partly supported 
P4 Is not supported 
P5 Is not supported 
P6 Is partly supported 
Table 4.4 Conclusions on propositions 
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5 Conclusions, Discussion, and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions 
The buyer-supplier relationship is central in the present study. BVP is a procurement method that 
presumes you can leave everything to the supplier as he or she is the expert. By uncovering all 
dominant information and identifying risks, the procuring organization will get the best contractor 
and the desired result. In practice, we often encounter mixed forms in buyer-supplier relationships. 
Governance mechanisms are employed to control the procurement project. Relational and 
contractual governance can also interact, as shown in research by Caniëls et al. (2012) and Cao and 
Lumineau (2015). Precisely the interaction between the governance mechanisms is seen as the key 
to a successful set-up and execution of complex procurement projects (Caniëls et al., 2012). In 
studies by Selviaridis et al. (2011) and Gelderman et al. (2015), the connection was also made to the 
interaction between relational and contractual governance during the process of stabilization and 
destabilization of the service definitions. The question is whether such an interaction could also be 
observed in BVP procurement projects. The problem definition for the present study is as follows: 
 
How is the (in)stability of specifications and (contractual and relational) governance handled in 
practice in the application of the BVP method in complex procurement trajectories? 
  
The most important conclusions of this study are: 
1. Not all risks can be identified beforehand and controlled as the BVP method presumes. 
2. The BVP procurement method is not a good method for coping with complexity. 
3. The BVP method was not the key to success, but rather the relationship and constant 
dialogue between the client and the contractor. 
4. The maximum price cannot be maintained in complex procurement projects because 
specifications are altered.  
5. In complex procurement trajectories, where BVP is applied, service definitions cannot be 
kept stable. 
6. The constant dialogue between buyer and supplier is necessary for success in case of 
complexity. 
7. Only being guided by the contract is impossible. The interaction between contractual and 
relational governance is the key to success, also in a BVP trajectory. 
 
An important contradiction of the BVP method in this case was that the maximum price had been 
adjusted. According to the BVP philosophy, that should not have happened. 
Apart from the evaluation phase, the service definitions regularly stabilized, destabilized, and 
subsequently stabilized. Both parties were involved in a continuous dialogue in which the service 
definitions were discussed. Contractual and relational governance were balanced in this case. The 
findings with regard to the phenomena relational and contractual governance and the (in)stability 
of service definitions are not in conformity with what the BVP philosophy pretends. BVP is a form of 
Performance Based Contracting and this study shows that PBC alone does not work. Relational 
aspects such as trust, flexibility, solidarity, and dialogue must also be present to make a 
procurement project into a success. 
5.2 Discussion 
This study provides insight into the application of the BVP procurement method as specific form of 
PBC in complex procurement trajectories. Kleemann and Essig (2013) have conducted research into 
the improvement of procurement results in complex trajectories. Their study describes the 
Performance Based Contracting (PBC). It is a procurement method that aims for results and 
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outcome. BVP is a procurement method that aims for results. The present study shows how a 
complex project is procured by means of the BVP procurement method. The phenomena complexity, 
(in)stability of service definitions, and contractual and relational governance are described in light 
of BVP. A central question in this study is whether BVP realizes all expectations it pretends.  
The present study builds on studies by Selviaridis (Selviaridis et al., 2011), Gelderman (Gelderman 
et al., 2015) and Caniëls (Caniëls, Gelderman and Vermeulen, 2012). 
 
Theoretical expectations 
In literature, the most important characteristics and principles of the BVP procurement method are 
described. BVP is a way of procuring in which the order is drafted in a more functional manner and 
is not muddled with a huge amount of detail specifications. The offering party is free to give its own 
interpretation to the order, if the functional specifications are met. The client indicates what it 
wants, and the contractor determines how it will be delivered. “In the pre-award phase, client and 
contractor take the time to coordinate what they expect from each other, they plan the project, and 
they make agreements on the control of risks and the utilization of opportunities.” 
The contractor must minimize risks and be accountable for risks, but must also dare to take risks if 
innovative work is necessary. Maximize opportunities and act in the interest of the client, focus on 
the end result for the client, and signal problems as early as possible. According to Kashiwagi 
(2011), BVP is a good procurement method to cope with complexity. 
 
The implicit promises of BVP are:  
 There is room for innovative solutions. 
 There are no high expenses for additional work and the maximum price is fixed. 
 The contractor works out the order himself (design and construction and possible 
maintenance); this gives the contractor room for creativity.  
 The contractor is accountable for the risks. The contractor will ‘automatically’ think along 
with the client. The consequences of ambiguity and uncertainties, problems, and delays are 
eventually to be paid by the contractor itself. 
 Contractors do not have to spend as much time on the procurement process because detail 
specification is not necessary. 
 The client can let go of the contents and trust the contractor; less hours of testing in terms of 
content (the details), but rather monitoring the delivered performance. 
 Because there is more room for the contractor, various approaches are possible and the 
client can select the contractor on the basis of quality for the price.  
 Minimization of communication, transactions, and decision making. 
 
Empirical observation  
The empirical observations from the present study contradict that which BVP pretends. The 
propositions have been drawn up in light of what the BVP method pretends. Table 4.4 indicates to 
what extent the propositions are supported by the research results. Four out of the six propositions 
are not supported. The other two are only partly supported.  
P1 and P2 are not supported at all. The research results do not show that all risks were identified 
because undesired events have occurred during the execution of the project. The undesired events 
have also led to additional work and expenses. The contractor has also indicated that it is in fact 
impossible to control all risks. The maximum price has also not been maintained, which is contrary 
to what BVP pretends. 
P3 is partly supported. The original offer is not altered in general terms, because it is described in 
general terms. In the concretization phase, a lot of alterations occurred on detail level where 
matters were added or changed. There is definitely negotiation on the specifications. Furthermore, 
additional wishes were added. P4 is also not supported, as the constant dialogue between buyer and 
39 
 
supplier in this complex project created dynamics in the service definitions. P5 is also not 
supported. After the contract was taken out, the dialogue between buyer and supplier continued 
and alterations were made. Adjustment was certainly not a one-way street, but occurred by mutual 
consultation, and the decision making also occurred jointly. The last proposition, P6, is partly 
supported. Contractual and relational governance were balanced in this case. Contractual 
governance was not the main control mechanism. Relational norms and values also played a large 
role in the project management. 
Because no proposition is fully supported or only partly supported, it has been shown in the present 
study that only output-orientation is impossible in complex procurement trajectories. Performance 
based contracting (PBC), which includes BVP, aims for output. The present study has demonstrated 
that, in order to cope with complexity, a constant dialogue between buyer and supplier is necessary. 
The strict application of the BVP procurement method is not feasible. Relational norms such as 
flexibility, trust, solidarity, and shared norms and values, are necessary for the successful 
completion of a procurement project. The theoretical expectations of BVP are not fully realized. BVP 
has led to innovations, but success was achieved by means of other forces that occurred during this 
project. This is further elaborated on below. 
 
During the conclusion of the interviews, the respondents were asked what their overall impression 
of the BVP method is. It is notable that the respondents ascribe the success of the project to the BVP 
method, while the results of all other questions point out that BVP is thought to be too rigid. The 
respondents indicate that BVP leads to innovative solutions and creativity of the contractor. This 
matches with the theoretical expectations of BVP. The contractor has provided an innovative 
solution and has delivered a properly working installation. This could have given rise to the bias of 
the respondents. The success is ascribed to BVP, because the method has led to innovation and 
because the experience they had with traditional procurement methods was negative. In traditional 
procurement methods, the client prescribes the solution in the smallest detail. Therefore, the failure 
of such projects is often ascribed to the client as they took the position of expert. The contractor is 
forced in a tight position and is unable to use all his knowledge and expertise. In traditional 
procurement method, the dialogue between the parties is absent, which creates noise. However, the 
success cannot be ascribed to the BVP method alone as the results of this study show. The 
respondents make a few contradictory statements that do not match the ascribing of the success to 
the BVP method.  
Statements such as: it is not possible to merely aim for output, a constant dialogue is vital to the 
success of a project, relationship is just as important as contract, and not all risks can be identified. 
Particularly the latter can lead to the marking down of risks. 
 
What is absent from traditional procurement methods is the dialogue between parties which may 
explain the failure in complex procurement projects. In this case, parties were engaged in a constant 
dialogue with each other and undesired events, additional wishes, and alterations were solved in 
consultation with each other. This was the key to success.  
Moreover, the contractor was not the only party accountable for non-identified risks.  
 
In case of complexity, dialogue between parties is a necessity, as this study also confirms, and that 
was the reason why the client has not strictly applied the principles and characteristics of BVP. A 
fighting relationship can be prevented by means of dialogue and relational norms and the parties 
have a common goal. The client has applied certain elements of BVP such as not prescribing the 
solutions to the problem. 
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5.3 Recommendations for business 
The most important conclusions of the present study have been reported in section 5.1. The 
interaction between the governance mechanisms is seen as the key to a successful set-up and 
execution of complex procurement projects (Caniëls et al., 2012). Studies by Selviaridis et al. (2011) 
and Gelderman et al. (2015) have also demonstrated the link to the interaction between relational 
and contractual governance during the process of stabilization and destabilization of the service 
definitions. 
 
BVP is not good method for coping with complexity. A good relationship between buyer and 
supplier is a must for the successful completion of a project. Merely aiming for output is therefore 
unwise in complex procurement trajectories. A continuous dialogue between supplier and buyer 
creates understand and removes noise between the parties. Matters such as shared norms and 
values, solidarity, flexibility, and trust belong to a complex procurement trajectory. However, there 
must be a balance and interaction between relational and contractual governance. It is a good thing 
that disputes and alterations are solved on the basis of relational governance, but too much trust 
can also lead to opportunistic behavior. Contractual control mechanisms function as an incentive. 
Nor is it a disadvantage that service definitions are under discussion. This provides interaction 
between buyer and supplier and leads to renewed insights that improve the quality of the service 
provision or the product to be delivered.  
In this case, the BVP philosophy proved to be too rigid and is not feasible for complex procurement 
trajectories in practice. A focus on output alone leads to the supplier marking down risks and 
creates a fighting relationship between the parties. Certain components of the BVP method can be 
applied in complex procurement projects. The interviews with tenderers and the room offered to 
tenders for ideas are good components with which tenderers are not limited in their creativity. 
However, there must be continuous dialogue and the governance mechanisms must be balanced. 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research  
In the present study, a case was researched in which a project was procured by means of the BVP 
procurement method. The project aims to construct a CHP installation and to optimize the 
utilization of biogas. Characteristic of such projects is that the market may offer a variety of 
technical solutions. It is up to the buyer to choose the right and best solution. There is a great 
dynamic in innovations in the field of technology. The researched case is a case with a specific 
problem that has occurred only within the context of this Water Authority. The offered and applied 
solution has not been previously applied at a Water Authority. That influences the procurement 
trajectory and the interaction between buyer and supplier. It is recommended to study the BVP 
procurement method in cases with complexity, but that do not concern innovations. It is likely that 
the dynamics are different in such cases.  
 
A number of limitations of the present study are discussed below. 
This case concerns a single case study and relies on the results of this single case. The question is 
how the phenomena of (in)stability and contractual and relational governance manifest themselves 
in a different environment. For instance, at other Water Authorities or government bodies such as 
municipalities, provinces, Rijkswaterstaat (Department of Waterways and Public Works), or the 
Rijksoverheid (Central Government). It is recommended to conduct research in these environments. 
The researched case took place at a Water Authority with an obligation to tender. Procurement of 
services, deliveries, and works are bound to the Procurement Act and the internal procurement 
policy. It is recommended to study cases in the private sector in which no Procurement Act applies 
and the buyer has more freedom to determine how a procurement procedure is performed. 
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Water Authority Vechtstromen, where this study was conducted, has a clear organizational 
structure. There is a procurement department that collaborates well with the internal clients. 
Knowledge of procurement and content-related material knowledge are combined well at 
Vechtstromen. This contributes to the professionalization of procurement and influences the 
procurement process. The results of research at other organizations could be dependent upon how 
the procurement process is organized. Furthermore, how suppliers are dealt with also influences 
the results. It is recommended to take the abovementioned aspects into account in other 
organizations, and which results it yields when the procurement process is organized differently.  
The validity of the research results rests on a proper and extensive procurement dossier and on 
seven respondents from entirely different disciplines who were involved in the procurement 
process. There was a lot of knowledge present as it concerned a procurement process in which they 
were intensively involved. The study focused on the BVP procurement method to cope with 
complexity. It is recommended to research how the phenomena manifest themselves in other 
procurement methods, for instance the competition-oriented dialogue. Additionally, it can be 
researched whether other procurement methods might also be used to cope with complexity. 
The Water Authority does not have a lot of experience with the application of the BVP procurement 
method. While conducting the research, it became clear that employees and contractors had to be 
briefed beforehand about the BVP method. It is recommended to conduct research in organizations 
that have extensive experience with the BVP method, such as Rijkswaterstaat.  
The results of the present study can certainly not be generalized as it concerns a single case study. 
Further research could contribute to the generalizability. This study confirms the research results 
by Caniëls et al. (2012), Selviaridis et al. (2011) and Gelderman et al. (2015). The present research 
also showed that it is a good thing that the service definitions stabilized and destabilized, etc. The 
interaction between relational and contractual governance and the balance between these also 
played an important role in the management of the contract.  
 
Table 5.1: BVP in theory and in practice 
BVP in theory BVP as opposed to the theory 
Contractor is the expert and makes sure 
the client makes as few decisions as 
possible  
Buyer and contractor make decisions 
together in consensus.  
As little communication as possible Continuous dialogue 
Using dominant information  Sharing information 
Controlling risks Discus risks 
Thinking from we (win-win) Shared values and goals. 
Listening, observing and streamlining  Shared norms and improve together  
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Appendix 1:  Design and Set-up of Interviews 
The design and set-up of the interviews has been detailed in this appendix. At the beginning of the 
interview, the type of information sought is explained. The interview is organized on the basis of the 
BVP procurement process. The interview questions are subdivided into the phenomena relational 
and contractual governance and the (in)stability of service definitions and the BVP procurement 
process. Whether and when the phenomena have occurred is investigated. Additionally, the 
questions concern how the respondents have dealt with the phenomena. With regard to the BVP 
procurement process, the respondents are also asked whether the BVP philosophy actually yields 
the results it pretends to or whether the forces of the phenomena relational and contractual 
governance and the (in)stability of the service definitions also play a role. 
 
General interview structure 
Phase 1 
Explaining the purpose of the interview, which information is sought, and what will be done with 
the results. 
Phase 2 
Aimed at the interviewee. Who is he/she, which position do they have, which role do they fulfill 
within the organization and the procurement process, what interest did they have in the results, and 
what are their authorizations. Obtaining information on the organization in which the respondent 
works. 
Phase 3 
Aimed at discovering why the BVP procurement process was chosen and what caused the trajectory 
to be complex.  
Phase 4 
Aimed at the BVP procurement process. Discovering whether all advantages are actually achieved. 
Phase 5 
Aimed at the phenomena relational and contractual governance, (in)stability of the service 
definitions, and the BVP procurement process. Explaining the phenomena. 
Phase 6 
Concluding the interview and asking whether the respondent has any relevant information that has 
not yet been discussed.  
 
Introduction 
1. Thanking the respondent for his/her time and cooperation.  
2. Emphasizing anonymity.  
3. Explaining the goal of the study, namely study of the experiences with BVP procurement 
method.   
 
A. General questions  
1. What type of company do you work? 
2. What is the core business of your company/organization?  
3. How many employees does your organization have? Could you give an indication of the 
turnover? 
4. Which job position do you fulfill at your employer and what does this job position entail? 
5. What was your role in the BVP trajectory optimization utilization biogas sewage treatment 
plant Emmen? 
6. Did you contribute to the drawing up of the service definitions? If yes, what role did you 
play?  
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7. Which aspects of execution of the project proved to be successful or unsuccessful? To what 
extent did the BVP trajectory influence this in your opinion? Could you clarify this by means 
of examples? 
 
 
B. The BVP procurement process 
1. Could you clarify why the BVP method was chosen? What were the most important 
arguments? 
2. Could you indicate what made the project complex? Could you give examples?  
3. Is the BVP method a good method to cope with complexity? Why is it/is it not? 
4. Has the BVP method led to more transparency, by taking responsibility, dominant 
information, and measuring performances? 
 
C. Selection of supplier 
1. To what extent did the client opt for the qualitatively best contractor? 
2. To what extent can the contractor be considered proactive and innovative? Could you give 
examples of this in this project? 
3. How did the client gather information and how was this used in the selection process? Did 
the client really gather as much information as possible? 
4. According to the BVP method, all risks are identified beforehand so the client is not 
confronted with calamities and unforeseen situations at a later stage. Was that the case 
here? If yes, how did that occur? If not, which calamities/unforeseen situations have 
occurred? Please give examples and descriptions.  
5. In principle, the client determines a maximum price that is not increased in the application 
of the BVP procurement method. How did this go in this project? 
 
D. The (in)stability of service definitions 
1. The stabilization and destabilization of specifications in a BVP trajectory occur because of 
the identification of risks by the contractor, not in consultation with the client. Was that the 
case in this project? Could you describe this? 
2. In the concretization phase of the BVP procurement method, the original offer of the 
contractor is no longer altered. Was that the case in this project? Could you clarify?  
3. In which phase or phases of the BVP procurement trajectory have the service definitions 
been altered?  
4. Why were the service definitions altered and who called these into question?  
5. Was there uncertainty with regard to the service definitions and could you clarify? 
6. Did the service definitions stabilize as the BVP procurement process advanced? 
7. If you consider the four phases of the BVP procurement method, have the service definitions 
remained unaltered from the start of the BVP trajectory?  
8. Is it possible to keep the service definitions stable in a BVP procurement process? Why/why 
not? 
9. Is the continuous dialogue an essential aspect for achieving good results in your opinion?  
10. Were there limiting requirements in your opinion? 
 
E. Contractual and relational governance 
1. How did the contract arise? Was that drawn up by the contractor in conformity with the BVP 
philosophy or did the contract arise in consultation between the client and contractor? 
Could you describe this process?  
2. In principle, specifications are fixed and are no longer altered after the contract has been 
entered into. If adjustments are needed, this is done by the contractor. The client is not 
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involved in this, only informed of it. Is that what happened in this project? Could you give 
examples of this? 
3. Which formal measurable performance indicators have been established in the contract? 
How did these arise and was there uncertainty about the measurability? 
4. Did the focus purely lie on formal performance indicators such as timely delivery, price, 
invoicing, etc.?  
5. Have penalty clauses been included in the contract and were these eventually used? 
6. To what extent was the contract seen as a sign of little trust between the client and 
contractor?  
7. Did adjustment occur after the contract was taken out? If yes, how did this arise and how did 
the decision making take place?  
8. Did factors such as uncertainty and capital lead to a market contract? 
9. Did calamities occur after the contract was entered into? If yes, how were these reported 
and solved? 
10. How did the control of the contract occur during the execution of the project? To what 
extent was there sufficient and adequate direction from the contract? 
11. Relational norms can form an important basis for the collaboration and communication 
between client and contractor. To what extent were there shared values and norms in the 
field of (i) flexibility, (ii) solidarity, (iii) the exchange of information between clients and 
contractors, in your opinion? 
12. To what extent was there trust between the client and the contractor? And did that trust 
play a role in the guidance of the contractor by the client? Could you give examples?  
13. In your opinion, were matters such as solidarity and trust essential in contributing to a 
successful trajectory or would the successes also have been achieved if output had been the 
sole focus? 
14. Guidance by the client is possible on the basis of the contract, but also on the basis of trust 
and shared values and norms. What was the most important method of guidance in this 
project? Could you clarify? 
 
F. Conclusion interview 
1. When you look back on your experiences with the BVP procurement method, what is your 
overall evaluation of the method? How practical is this method? Why and when does it work, 
when does it not? Which results were eventually achieved by the application of this method? 
In hindsight, would another contract form or tender method have been better? 
2. Thank for cooperation and make possible further agreements.  
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Appendix 2:  Overview Interview Schedule 
Name Code Function Company/Organization  Role in this project 
1. Brigitte Broekert BB Procurement advisor 
and process 
supervisor 
 Water Authority 
Vechtstromen 
Tender manager and 
supervisor tender.  
2. Gerrit Supheert GS Project leader 
Execution 
Water Authority 
Vechtstromen 
 
Content-related input 
during tender and 
project leader during.  
3. Joost van Dijk JD Process executor 
Purification 
Water Authority 
Vechtstromen 
Input content-related 
knowledge on the 
project. Manager sewage 
treatment plant Emmen. 
4. Vincent van der  
Linden 
VL Project leader  
 
Water Authority 
Vechtstromen 
(no longer employed at 
the Water Authority 
since November 11, 
2015) 
Content-related project 
leader tender process. 
5. Louis Jurjus LJ Advisory Engineer   Arcadis, no longer 
employed at Arcadis, 
but self-employed 
Support tender process 
particularly order 
formulation, objectives, 
boundary conditions, 
UAV-gc (Uniform 
Administrative 
Conditions for integrated 
contracts), risk 
inventory, etc. 
6. Barry Verduijn BV Project leader  SH+E (SH+E was taken 
over by another 
market party and is 
now called Eliquo 
Water & Energy BV) 
Executor of the service 
provider. Charged with 
writing offer and tender 
process. Supervisor 
design and realization 
process contractor. 
7. Rick Langereis RL Director SH+E (SH+E was taken 
over by another 
market party and is 
now called Eliquo 
Water & Energy BV) 
Project manager during 
the tender process and 
during the execution. 
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Appendix 3:  Overview Procurement Dossier per Phase of BVP Process 
Doc. 
No. 
Document name For 
analysis  
Phase BVP 
procurement 
process 
1  Appendix A Tender ballot and tender document version 
1.2 
Y Preparation 
2  Appendix A Tender ballot and tender document version 
1.3 
Y Preparation 
3  Appendix B Basic agreement Y Preparation 
4  Appendix C Own statement N Preparation 
5  Appendix D Declaration director regarding illegality   N Preparation 
6  Appendix E Detailing of MEAT criteria Y Preparation 
7  Appendix F Tender ballot and tender document Y Preparation 
8  Appendix G1 Scope Y Preparation 
9  Appendix G2 Risk dossier Y Preparation 
10  Appendix G3 Opportunities dossier Y Preparation 
11  Appendix G4 Position profiles Y Preparation 
12  Appendix H Protocol individual exchange of information  Y Preparation 
13  Appendix J Checklist N Preparation 
14  Appendix K Overview tender documents Y Preparation 
15  Appendix L Acknowledgement of receipt N Preparation 
16  Presentation information meeting BVP Y Preparation 
17  Report presentation information meeting Y Preparation 
18  Descriptive document optimization utilization biogas 
sewage treatment plant Emmen  
 
Y Preparation 
19  Report pre-bid meeting January 3, 2013 Y Preparation 
20  Appendix 2 Design order sewage treatment plant  Y Preparation 
21  Appendix 2A Folder process sewage treatment plant 
Emmen 
N Preparation 
22  Appendix 3A Technical annual report 2011 Y Preparation 
23  Appendix 3B Appendices Technical annual report 2011 Y Preparation 
24  Appendix 3C Graphs technical annual report 2011 N Preparation 
25  Appendix 4 Drawings gas engines sewage treatment plant 
Emmen 
N Preparation 
26  Appendix 5 Flow chart gas engines N Preparation 
27  Appendix 6 Gas street scheme CHP  N Preparation 
28  Appendix 7 PIDs biogas line sewage treatment plant 
Emmen 
Y Preparation 
29  Appendix 8 Sludge company N Preparation 
30  Appendix 9 Report usage Y Preparation 
31  Appendix 10 Energy efficiency plan Y Preparation 
32  Appendix 11 Report Evaluation heat mixers N Preparation 
33  Appendix 12 Detailing of CHP scenarios sewage treatment 
plant Emmen 
Y Preparation 
34  Appendix A Descriptive document requirement 
specification 
 Preparation 
35  Clarification notice Y Preparation 
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36  Information Notice 1 Y Preparation 
37  Information Notice 2 Including maps, usage figures, gas 
composition, and reports. 
Y Preparation 
38  Information Notice 3 Y Preparation 
39  Report information meeting November 1, 2012  Y Preparation 
40  Rejection Habo, Heijmans and Host Y Evaluation 
41  Reasoning interviews Y Evaluation 
42  Reasoning qualitative documents Y Evaluation 
43  Evaluation quality documents and interviews anonymous  Y Evaluation 
44  Evaluation questions risk and opportunities dossier  Y Evaluation 
45  Final awarding to SH+E Y Evaluation 
46  Interview questions  Y Evaluation 
47  Moving to pre-award SH+E Y Evaluation 
48  Planning interviews N Evaluation 
49  Report interview Barry Verduin SH+E Y Evaluation 
50  Report interview Rick Langereis Y Evaluation 
51  Basic agreement SH+E Y Concretization 
phase 
52  Signed agreement Y Concretization 
phase 
53  Start meeting Pre-award Y Concretization 
phase 
54  Action plan pre-award SH+E Y Concretization 
phase 
55  Report pre-award with SH+E Y Concretization 
phase 
56  Summary weeklies (weeklies 1 to 21) Y Execution phase 
57  Replacing main distributor Y Execution phase 
58  Evaluation tender 20130716 Y Execution phase 
 
Clarification of table Appendix 2 
The procurement dossier contains fifty-eight documents which have been subdivided per phase of 
the BVP process. These are documents that have gone through a certain development during the 
procurement process. The table contains an overview of all documents. For each document, it has 
been determined during which phase of the BVP procurement process the document was created. 
Additionally, it has been evaluated whether the document contains information on specific BVP 
characteristics, service definitions, and contractual and relational governance and therefore has 
meaning for the present study. The second column of the table indicates whether a document was 
selected for further investigation. The third column indicates during which phase the document was 
created.   
 
The phases of the BVP procurement process deviate from the traditional procurement process. In 
the preparation phase of this BVP trajectory, the following activities have been performed: 
1. The BVP method was first explained and presented to all those involved. 
2. The scope and specifications have been drawn up. 
3. The tender documents have been drawn up. 
4. The tender has been published and the questions of tenderers have been answered. 
5. Market parties have submitted their tender. 
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The activities in the evaluation phase were:  
1. The qualitative evaluation of the offers. 
2. The conducting of interviews. 
3. The preliminary awarding and rejecting of other parties. 
  
The activities in the concretization phase were:  
1. The consultation between client and contractor regarding the further elaboration of the 
order. 
2. The final awarding of the order to the contractor. 
3. The drawing up of the contract and the signing of the contract by both parties. 
 
The activities in the execution phase were: 
1. Monitoring progress. 
2. Adjusting in case of calamities and incorporating additional wishes into the execution. 
3. Evaluating the tender. 
  
The procurement dossier has a legal character because the client is a government and has an 
obligation to tender. 
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Appendix 4: Project Scheme and Scope 
 
 
The previously mentioned project objectives and two critical principles have led to the following 
(summarized) scope as offered by SHE: 
 
o A new CHP installation with a capacity of 500kW. 
o A biogas pre-treatment installation for the necessary biogas conditioning for CHP and 
existing boiler. 
o A smoke gas after-treatment installation for the new CHP to ensure this meets the BEMS 
(Decree on emission limit values for medium-sized combustion installations).  
o An adjustment/renewal of the electro-technical installation with which the electrical energy 
generated by the CHP is reliably supplied to the company network of the sewage treatment 
plant Emmen. 
o Detailing and implementation of a good heat regulation with which the sludge fermentation 
installation can be kept at the intended temperature by the new CHP and the existing (new) 
boiler. 
 
 
 
